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A MANUAL
OF
HINDU PANTHEISM
THE VEDÂNTASÂRA

TRANSLATED WITH COPIOUS ANNOTATIONS

BY

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PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.

THE design of this little work is to provide for missionaries, and for others who, like them, have little leisure for original research, an accurate summary of the doctrines of the Vedânta. If the people of India can be said to have now any system of religion at all, apart from mere caste observances, it is to be found in the Vedânta philosophy, the leading tenets of which are known to some extent in every village. The subject is therefore one of great importance, and the Vedântasâra is generally acknowledged to be the most satisfactory summary of the modern phases of it.

In the notes, I have endeavoured to furnish a full explanation of every difficulty, and of each point needing elucidation, and in so doing have drawn largely from the writings of well-known Oriental scholars. The text of the Vedântasâra which I have used is that published in Calcutta in 1875 by Pandit Jîvânanda Vidyâsâgara, with the Commentary of Nṛsiṃhasarasvatî.

The following is a list of the works and editions referred to in the translation and notes. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Banerjea's *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy*, and to

Dr. Fitzedward Hall's *Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems*. These two are, in my judgment, the most valuable works of their kind in the English language.

Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy. By Rev. K. M. Banerjea. Williams & Norgate, 1861.

A Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems. By Nehemiah Nilakantha Śāstrī Gore. Translated by Fitzedward Hall, D.C.L. Calcutta, 1862.

Miscellaneous Essays. By H. T. Colebrooke. New edition, with Notes by Professor Cowell. Trubner & Co., 1873.

The Philosophy of the Upanishads. By Professor A. E. Gough. Calcutta Review for 1878.

Original Sanskrit Texts. By J. Muir, D.C.L., LL.D., vols. iii.-v.

Sacred Books of the East. Edited by F. Max Muller, vol. i., *Upanishads*. Clarendon Press, 1879.

Professor H. H. Wilson's *Works*, viz. :—

(a) *Essays on the Religion of the Hindus*, 2 vols. Edited by Dr R. Rost. Trubner & Co., 1862.

(b) *Essays on Sanskrit Literature*, 3 vols. Edited by Dr. Rost. Trubner & Co., 1864-65.

(c) *Vishnu Purāna*, 6 vols. Edited by Dr. Fitzedward Hall Trubner & Co., 1864-77.

The History of Indian Literature. By Professor Weber, translated from the second German edition. Trubner & Co., 1878

The Indian Antiquary, vols. i., ii., and iv. Bombay, 1872, 1873, 1875.

Anti-Theistic Theories, the Baird Lecture for 1877. By R. Flint, D.D. Blackwood & Sons, 1879.

Works by Rev. R. Spence Hardy. Published by Williams & Norgate.

(a) *Eastern Monachism*. 1860.

(b) *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*. 1866.

(c) *Manual of Buddhism*, 2d edition. 1880

Elphinstone's *History of India*, 6th edition. By E. B. Cowell. J. Murray. 1874.

Works by Dr. Ballantyne :—

(a) *The Sāṅkhya Aphorisms of Kapila*, translated. Bibliotheca Indica Series. Calcutta, 1865.

(b) *The Aphorisms of the Yoga Philosophy*, Book I., translated. Allahabad, 1852.

(c) *The Aphorisms of the Nyāya Philosophy*, translated. Allahabad, 1850.

(d) *A Lecture on the Vedānta*. Allahabad, 1850.

- The Aphorisms of Sāṅḍilya.* Translated by Professor Cowell. Bibliotheca Indica Series. Calcutta, 1878.
- The History of Philosophy.* By G. H. Lewes, 2 vols., 4th edition. Longmans & Co., 1871.
- Panchadaśī.* By Bhāratīrthavidyāraṇya. Bombay, 1879.
- Upadeśasahasrī.* By Śankarāchārya. Published in "*The Pandit.*" Benares, 1868-69.
- Adhyātma-Rāmāyaṇa.* Calcutta, 1872.
- Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.* Edited and translated by Dr. Haug, 2 vols.
- Sāṅkhyapravachanabhāṣya.* Edited by Pandit Jibānanda Vidyāsāgara. Calcutta.
- Kāvya Prakāśa.* Edited by Pandit Maheśa Chandra Nyāyaratna. Calcutta, 1866.
- Hastamalaka.* Bound up with Jibānanda's edition of Vedāntasāra.
- Vākyasudhā.* By Śankarāchārya. Edited by Windischmann in 1833 under the erroneous title of *Bālābodhinī*. (Vide Hall's "*Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of Indian Philosophical Systems.*")
- Naishkarmyasiddhi.* By Sureśvarāchārya. MSS. No. 1103 and 777 in India Office Library.
- Pātanjaladarśana.* Edited by Jibānanda Vidyāsāgara. Calcutta, 1874.
- Sāṅkhyasāra.* Edited by Fitzedward Hall. Calcutta, 1862. (Bibliotheca Indica Series.)

UPANISHADS.

- Kaushītaki* and *Maitrī.* Edited and translated by Professor Cowell. 1861 and 1870.
- Kena*, *Kaṭha Muṇḍaka*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Chhândogya*, *Taittirīya*, *Aitareya*, *Svetāśvatara*, and *Bṛihadāraṇyaka.* Edited by Jibānanda Vidyāsāgara at Calcutta. They are fac-similes of those brought out in the Bibliotheca Indica Series.
- Muktikā.* Edited by Jibānanda Vidyāsāgara.

G. A. J.

TEIGNMOUTH, August 1881.

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.



TEN years have elapsed since the issue of the first edition, and now there is a demand for a third. That the work has, in some measure, answered its purpose, several friends in India have testified, and it has been my endeavour now to make it still more useful. To this end the Sanskrit original has been carefully collated with six good manuscripts, and, as the result, a few mistranslations, due to a corrupt text, have been eliminated. Of the editions of the *Vedāntasāra* now extant, that in Dr. Böhlingk's *Chrestomathie* of 1877 is decidedly the most accurate; but even that seems susceptible of emendation in a few places, if the MSS. which I have used are to be relied upon.

There were also a few mistakes of another class, due to the influence of 'Ignorance with its two powers.' For the removal of these I am chiefly indebted to my learned friend, Professor Cowell. The notes, too, have been thoroughly revised, and in many cases enlarged or rewritten. Nine years' study of the Upanishads and their literature has thrown more light on this subject also, and necessitated a modification of some views pre-

viously held which had been derived chiefly from the writings of others.

When issuing the first edition I made no allusion to the number of Sadânanda's quotations, unverified in Europe, which I had succeeded in tracing to their source. The amount of time and labour involved in this search can be estimated by those only who have themselves been engaged in a similar task! Those which I eventually found in Sureśvara's *Naishkarmya-siddhi*, a work which then existed in manuscript only but has recently been edited by myself in the Bombay Sanskrit Series, gave the most trouble; but I should have been spared it if I had then possessed a copy of Râmatîrtha's Commentary, which, in at least two instances, names that treatise as the source of the quotation. For most of the other non-Vedic references I went from book to book till I found them. That from the *Vâkyasudhâ* was given me by Professor Cowell. Three passages which baffled me in 1881 I have since discovered in the *Panchadaśī*, but two or three still defy pursuit. It is possible that they may have been taken from Sureśvara's voluminous *Vārttika* on the *Bṛihadâraṇyakabhāṣya*, shortly to be published in the Ânandâśrama Series, or from the *Yogavâsishṭha*.

During the last ten years, several translations of Indian philosophical works have been published, and a few original treatises on the same theme. It may be of use to students in India who are not Sanskritists, but who wish to explore more fully the Vedantic section of

this interesting field of study, to indicate a few of those which would be helpful.

The Philosophy of the Upanishads. By Professor A. Gough—a book full of interest. It forms one of Trübner's *Oriental Series*. 1882.

The Sarvadarsanasamgraha. Translated by Professors Cowell and Gough. Trubner's *Oriental Series*. 1882.

The Panchadaśī (a standard Vedāntic work). Translated in part by Mr. A. Venis, and published in *The Pandit* (a Benares periodical) for 1883, 1884, and 1886.

The Vedāntaparibhāṣā. Translated by the same scholar, and published in *The Pandit* for 1882–85.

Hindu Orthodoxy and Hindu Heterodoxy. Two useful volumes by Mr. Rāmchandra Bose, M A., and published in Calcutta.

A Treatise on the Yoga Philosophy. An interesting pamphlet by Sub-Assistant Surgeon N. C Paul, and published in Benares in 1882.

The Tattvamuktāvalī. Edited and translated by Professor Cowell, and published in vol. xv., part 2, of the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*. It has been reprinted in a separate form.

The Vedānta Sūtras, with the Commentary of Śāṅkarācārya. Translated by Dr. G. Thibaut, and published in the *Sacred Books of the East Series*, 1890. Its introduction is most valuable.

Being now, I fear, at the end of my official career in India, I would take this opportunity of stating, for the encouragement of others, what an unfailing source of pleasure and profit my Sanskrit studies have proved during the last twenty-nine years. An old missionary of the American Board of Foreign Missions, himself a diligent student, advised me in 1862 to take up 'the language of the gods,' and I have had abundant cause to be thankful for his suggestion. There is no more interesting country in the world than India, and a close acquaintance with its people, their ways, and their literature, amply repays one. A young man, fond of study, whose lot is cast in that pleasant land, can find nothing more fascinating than the exploration of a

corner of the boundless field for research which lies all around him,—and one of its great charms is that there is still so much new ground to be examined. The beauties of the Sanskrit language alone afford sufficient to satisfy a lover of linguistics for a lifetime; and if he can study it at the feet of an old Śâstrî, he is in a more favoured position than the majority of students in Europe. And yet the number of Englishmen who make use of the splendid and unique opportunities thus afforded them for the study of the past, or who even make a persistent effort to understand the India of to-day, is painfully small. This may, in a measure, be owing to overwork, or to want of encouragement from the Government,—but the fact remains. An experience, however, of thirty-four years has shown me that those like the country and the people best who have the widest acquaintance with them,—and that lack of interest is generally due to lack of knowledge.

G. A. JACOB.

HAMPSTEAD, *November 1891.*

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VEDÂNTASÂRA.



INTRODUCTORY STANZA.

To the Self, existent, intelligence, bliss, impartite,
beyond the range of speech and thought, the sub-
strate of all, I resort for the attainment of the
desired thing.¹

¹ This, according to Nṛsiṃhasarasvatî, is 'final beatitude' (*nirāśreyasa*) ; but Rāmatīrtha says it is 'the removal of non-apprehension and misapprehension of the meaning of the Śâstra, and of conflicting views as to its meaning' (*Śâstrârthâpratipattanyathâpratipattivipratipattinirāsa*).

NOTES ON INTRODUCTORY STANZA.

"All philosophy strives after unity. It is its aim, its task, to reduce complexity to simplicity, the many to the one."¹ The Upanishads tell us that this was the aim of Indian philosophers, and they not always Brâhmans, in very early times. In the *Mundaka*, for example, it is related that the illustrious son of Śunaka approached the sage Angiras with due ceremony, and inquired of him what that was which, being known, all things would be known. He was told in reply that the wise regard "the invisible, intangible, unrelated, colourless one, who has neither eyes nor ears, neither hands nor feet, eternal, all-pervading, subtle and undecaying, as the source of all things." This is, of course, Brahma,² the so-called Absolute of the Vedânta, the Self of the verse before us; and the system then evolved from the inner consciousness of those early thinkers, but modified it would seem by Śankarâchârya, and so stereotyped by his successors, continues to the present day; and not only so, but whilst the other five schools have well-nigh ceased to exert any appreciable

¹ *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 410.

² This word is neuter, and must not be confounded with the masculine Brahmâ, a member of the Hindu triad. It is derived from the root *Bṛh*, 'to grow or increase,' and "perhaps its earliest signification was the *expansive force of nature*, regarded as a spiritual power, the power manifested most fully in vegetable, animal, and human life, but everywhere present, though unseen."—*Calcutta Review*, vol. lxvi. p. 14. Professor Max Muller thinks that "in choosing the neuter, the ancient sages tried to express something that should be neither male nor female, that should be, in fact, as far removed from weak human nature as weak human language could well express it; something that should be higher than masculine or feminine, not lower."—*Hibbert Lectures for 1878*, p. 312.

influence, this "has overspread the whole land, overgrown the whole Hindu mind and life."¹

In this opening verse Brahma is described as

1. *Existent (sat).*

The Vedânta postulates three kinds of existence, which it terms true (*pāramārthika*), practical (*vyāvahārika*), and apparent (*prātibhāsika*). Brahma is the sole representative of the first. The second includes Īśvara, individual souls, heaven, hell, and all phenomena. These are said to be imagined by ignorance, and to have no more true existence than things seen in a dream; but men have practical dealings with them as if they truly existed, so they are admitted to exist practically or conventionally. The third class comprises such things as a mirage, nacre mistaken for silver, or a snake imagined in a rope, which are the result of some defect, such as short-sight, &c., in addition to ignorance. Yet it is believed that "when a man on seeing nacre, takes it for silver, apparent silver is *really produced!*" All these then are, from certain stand-points, real existences; but, to him who has true knowledge, the first alone is real.² This theory of existences is intended to explain away the finite and establish the infinite; but it cannot be admitted to have been successful. The existence of an invisible Being, entirely out of relation to the world, and devoid of apprehension, will, activity, and all other qualities, cannot possibly be established.

2. *Intelligence (chit).*

This is the most common synonym of Brahma, but It is also spoken of—as, for example, in the *Taittirīya Upanishad*—as 'cognition' or 'knowledge' (*jñāna*). It must,

¹ *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 341.

² *Rational Refutation*, sec. iii. chap. i.

however, be clearly understood that *It is not a cogniser or intelligent*. In commenting on the passage of the Upanishad just referred to, Śankarâchârya says:—"Knowledge is here an abstract, indicating cognition, not the cognitive subject, being predicated of the ultimate along with truth and infinity. Truth and infinity would be incompatible with it did it imply a subject of cognition. If the pure idea were susceptible of modifications, how could it be pure and infinite? That is infinite which cannot be demarcated in any direction. If it were a knowing subject, it would be limited by its objects and its cognitions. . . . The knowledge of the absolute spirit, like the light of the sun, or like the heat in fire, is nought else than the absolute essence itself."¹

In the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad* (ver. 7), too, Brahma is said to be "neither² internally nor externally cognitive, neither conscious nor unconscious." This tenet is a necessity. For if Brahma were conscious, there would be objects of consciousness, which would involve dualism; for "wherever there is consciousness there is relation, and wherever there is relation there is dualism."³ The Hindu pantheist, therefore, allying himself with "a scepticism which denies the validity of the primary perceptions and fundamental laws of mind,"⁴ calmly annihilates the phenomenal, and with it his own self-consciousness, by calling it all illusory. It must be understood that the only ground for supposing Brahma to be 'intelligence,' is, that, in the state of practical existence, cognition of an object can only be effected by means of the internal organ, and that organ is declared to

¹ *Calcutta Review*, vol. lxvi. p. 19.

² *Anti Theistic Theories*, p. 423.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 419.

be itself unintelligent and to need an illuminator. The self-luminous Brahma is that illuminator! "It is not meant, however, that Brahma, by a voluntary exercise of his power, illumines that organ, for Brahma has no such power. The idea intended is, that the internal organ, simply by reason of its proximity to Brahma, which is unconscious, becomes illuminated, just as iron moves when brought near the magnet."¹ 'Intelligence,' therefore, means simply 'self-luminousness,' and its existence is surmised merely on the ground named above! But the internal organ² is a portion of the phenomenal, and therefore illusory. So too must be its illuminator. Brahma, therefore, as 'intelligence,' is not established.

3. Bliss (*ānanda*).

This has been characterised as "a bliss without the fruition of happiness," and rightly so. For absorption into Brahma is described as a permanent state "resembling precisely that of deep sleep,"—"a condition of insensibility,"—in which the emancipated spirit is without a body, mind, or cognition! Where is there any room in such a state for joy? "But what, in that case," says the author of the *Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya*, "becomes of the scripture which lays down that soul is happiness? The answer is: 'Because of there being cessation of misery, only in a loose acceptation does the term happiness denote soul.' . . . To move ambition in the dull or ignorant, the emancipated state, which really is *stoppage of misery*, Soul itself, is lauded to them by the

¹ *Rational Refutation*, pp. 214-216.

² In Sanskrit, *antaḥkaraṇa*. It consists of *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *chitta*, and yet is unintelligent!

Veda as happiness.”¹ Brahma, then, as joy, is wholly a product of the imagination.

4. *Impartite (akhaṇḍa)*.

According to the commentator *Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī*, this term means “devoid of anything of a like kind or of a different kind, and without internal variety.” A tree, for example, has the ‘internal variety’ of leaves, flowers, and fruit; it has things ‘of a like kind,’ in other trees—and things ‘of a different kind,’ in stones, &c.² But Brahma is not so, It being absolute and unchangeable unity. It is from the standpoint of true existence that It is regarded as impartite and solitary; for, from that of practical existence, It is appropriated to countless internal organs and underlies all phenomena.

5. *Substrate of all (akhilādhāra)*.

It is the substrate only in the way that nacre is of apparent silver, or that a rope is of the snake imagined in it; and, like the silver and the snake, the world is but a *vivartta* or illusory effect. Its illusory-material cause is Brahma, and ignorance its material cause. The writers of the older Upanishads, *i.e.*, the Vedāntists of the old school, were undoubtedly *pariṇāmavādins*, or believers in the *reality* of the world of perception;³ and, with them, Brahma was not its substrate or illusory-material cause, but the material from which it was evolved or developed, as the web from a spider, as foam from water, or as curd from milk.⁴ The passage quoted above from the *Muṇ-*

¹ *Rational Refutation*, pp. 33, 34. Socrates, too, regarded the *absence of pain* as pleasure. Vide *History of Philosophy*, vol. i. p. 186.

² *Panchadaś*, ii. 20.

³ Professor Gough rejects this view. Vide his *Philosophy of the Upanishads* in Trübner's *Oriental Series*

⁴ *Miscellaneous Essays*, i. 375, 376.

ḍaka Upanishad seems clearly to teach this doctrine when setting forth Brahma as the absolute unity, which being known, all things are known; and the context adds that "as a spider throws out and retracts [its web], as herbs spring up in the ground, and as hair is produced on the living person, so is the universe derived from the undecaying one" (i. 1, 7). It seems to be distinctly taught, too, in the *Chhândogya Upanishad*. The sixth book opens with a dialogue between a Brâhman named Āruṇi and his son Śvetaketu, who, at twenty-four years of age, has returned home on the completion of a twelve years' course of Vedic study. Seeing him full of conceit, his father asks him whether he had sought from his teacher that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known. On the son's confessing that he had not sought it, the father says, "My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is clay; and as, my dear, by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is gold; and as, my dear, by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is iron—thus, my dear, is that instruction."¹ That is to say, Brahma being known as material cause, all things are known. The son then remarks that his teacher could not have known this doctrine, and asks his father to explain it further. The latter then goes on to say, "In the beginning, my dear, this was the existent, one only, without a second. Some say that in the

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, i. 92.

beginning, this was the non-existent, one only, without a second; and from the non-existent the existent arose. But how could it be thus, my dear; how could the existent arise from the non-existent? In the beginning, my dear, this was indeed the existent, one only, without a second." Śankarâchârya says that 'this' refers to 'the universe' (*jagat*), and that 'in the beginning' means 'before production' (*prâgutpatteh*). The drift of the passage then surely is that this world, *a reality*, before its evolution, existed potentially in Brahma, its material cause. It, in fact, "proves the reality of the cause from the reality of the effect, and so declares the reality, not the falseness of all."¹ In the same Upanishad (iii. 14, 1), we find the words, "All this is indeed Brahma, being produced from, resolved into, and existing in It;" and the opening words of the *Aitareya Upanishad* are, "In the beginning this was the self, one only;" and in both cases, as before, 'this' is said to refer to the world of perception, which is treated as a reality.

In his valuable essay on the Vedânta, Colebrooke shows, by ample quotations, that this view of the world's reality and of Brahma's material causativity, was propounded by the early Vedântic teachers, including Śankarâchârya himself; and he considered the doctrine of Mâyâ, or the world's unreality, to be "a graft of a later growth," uncountenanced by the aphorisms of the Vedânta or by the gloss of Śankarâchârya. The learned editor of the new edition of Colebrooke's *Essays* thinks this "hardly correct" as regards Śankara, but adds, "There can hardly be a question as to the fact that the original *Vedânta* of the earlier *Upanishads* and of the *Sûtras* did not recog-

¹ *Ajho isms of Śāṇḍilya* translated by Cowell, p. 42.

nise the doctrine of *Mâyâ*. The earliest school seems to have held Brahma to be the material cause of the world in a grosser sense." As regards Śankarâchârya, the fact is that different portions of his comments on the aphorisms are mutually conflicting. For example, in one place he ridicules the idea of an infinite series of works and worlds subsisting in the relation of cause and effect, and then, elsewhere, distinctly advocates it. Again, when opposing the idealism of the Buddhists, he strongly maintains the *reality* of objects of perception, rebutting the objections advanced against it, and supports the tenet of the material causativity of Brahma; whilst on another occasion he accepts the theory of *Mâyâ*.¹

6. '*Beyond the range of speech or thought.*'

The following are some of the Vedic texts on this point:—"From which words turn back, together with the mind, not reaching It" (*Taittirîya*, ii. 9). "The eye goes not thither, nor speech, nor mind" (*Kena*, i. 3). "Unthinkable, unspeakable" (*Mândûkya*, 7).

The Vedântist creed, as held since the time of Śankarâchârya, *i.e.*, during the last thousand years, may, then, be thus summed up:—"Brahma, alone—a spirit; essentially existent, intelligence and joy; void of all qualities and of all acts; in whom there is no consciousness such as is denoted by 'I,' 'thou,' and 'it;' who apprehends no person or thing, nor is apprehended of any; who is neither parviscient nor omniscient; neither parvipotent nor omnipotent; who has neither beginning nor end; immutable and indefectible—is the true entity. All besides himself,

¹ *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*, pp. 109, 123, and chaps. vii. and viii. In the *Nṛisimhottaratâpanî*, and in other Upanishads of a comparatively late date, we, of course, have the doctrine of *Mâyâ* fully developed.

the entire universe, is false, that is to say, is nothing whatsoever. Neither has it ever existed, nor does it now exist, nor will it exist at any time future.”¹

It is very interesting to note the likeness between Brahma thus portrayed and the ‘Being’ of Parmenides, who was the contemporary of Buddha and Confucius. “Being, he argued, is absolutely one. It is not an abstract unity, but the only reality. It is so that it alone is. Being, he further affirmed, is continuous and indivisible; it is everywhere like to itself, and everywhere alike present. Were there parts in being, there would be plurality, and being would not be one—that is, would not be being. There can be no differences or distinctions in being; for what is different and distinct from being must be not-being, and not-being is not. . . . Being, he likewise held, is identical with thought. It could not otherwise be absolutely one. Thought, he said, is the same thing as being. Thought must be being; for being exists, and non-being is nothing.” “His not-being did not mean non-existence, but all that sense and ordinary thought apprehend as existence; it included earth, air, ocean, and the minds of men.”² This ‘being’ is exactly the *sat*, *chit*, and *akhaṇḍa* of the Vedānta, whilst the idea of ‘not-being’ coincides entirely with its *vyāvahārikī* or *prātibhāsikī sattā*.

¹ *Rational Refutation*, p. 176.

² *Anti-Theistic Theorics*, p. 353. Cf. also Lewes' *History of Philosophy*, i. 56.

I.

HAVING saluted my preceptor, who, from his having got rid of the notion of duality, is significantly named Advayânanda, I will now propound the essence of the Vedânta, according to my conception of it.

The Vedânta doctrine is based upon the Upanishads, and is likewise supported by the *Sârîraka sûtras* and other works.¹

¹ Such as the Bhagavad-Gitâ, &c.

NOTES ON SECTION I.

1. *Vedānta*.

This "literally signifies 'conclusion of the Veda,' and bears reference to the Upanishads, which are, for the most part, terminating sections of the Vedas to which they belong. It implies, however, *the doctrine* derived from them, and extends to books of sacred authority, in which that doctrine is thence deduced; and, in this large acceptance, it is the end and scope of the Vedas."¹

2. *Śārīraka sūtras*.

This is a collection of aphorisms composed by Bādarāyaṇa, and forms one of the six Darśanas or Systems of Philosophy. The word *śārīraka* is said to be derived from the noun *śārīraka*, which the commentator calls a contemptuous (*kutsita*) form of *śārīra*, 'body,' and means 'embodied' (soul). Śāṅkarāchārya's interpretation of these aphorisms and of the Upanishads, is the real authority for the tenets of the *Advaitavādins*.

Though this particular Vedāntic school has probably the largest number of adherents, still there are others, with a respectable following, which interpret the Upanishads differently. There is, for instance, Rāmānuja's System, current chiefly in Southern India, and called *Viśiṣṭādvaita*. It maintains the reality of the world and the separate existence of human and animal souls; both of which are denied by Śāṅkara. There is also the *Dvaitavāda* of Madhva or Āṇandatīrtha, which elaborates more fully some of the views propounded by Rāmānuja; and

¹ Colebrooke's *Essays*, i. 351.

likewise the sensuous system of Vallabhâchârya which is styled *Śuddhâdvaita*. A concise summary of the special characteristics of these Vedântic schools is given by Dr. R. G. Bhândârkar in his Report on the search for Sanskrit MSS. in the Bombay Presidency during the year 1883-84, and a fuller account in Wilson's *Essays on the Religion of the Hindus*.

Prior to the rise of Buddhism, dogma and ritual held undisputed sway. The followers of that heresy, however, presumed to appeal to reason, and their system was at once stigmatised as 'the science of reason' (*hetuśāstra*), which was then synonymous with heresy. This was perhaps the first systematic departure from the Mantras and Brâhmaṇas; but the Brâhmanas were soon compelled to follow suit, and to them we owe the six so-called orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. I say 'so-called,' for the teaching of the Systems is no less a departure from the old religion than Buddhism is; but they profess respect for the Vedas, whilst the Buddhists openly repudiate them. The following remarks by a native scholar will be of interest here:—

"In justice to the founders of our schools, we must confess that the opinions which they embodied in their systems had probably long been floating in the popular mind. The Buddhist defection had no doubt produced a spirit of scepticism from which the authors of the Sûtras were not wholly free. And they, perhaps, laboured to give such a shape to those sceptical opinions as might be consistent with the supremacy of the Brâhmanical order. Two things, they thought, were necessary for the maintenance of that supremacy—the toleration of the Vedas and the substitution of metaphysical speculations for the too

frequent performance of the Vedic ritual. Without the first, the foundation of Brâhmanical supremacy would be cut away. Without the second, the Brâhmanical mind would be doomed to a state of perpetual imbecility, familiar only with ceremonial observances, and utterly unable to meet the challenges put forth by sceptical heretics in the arena of controversy. Not that there was much essential difference in point of doctrine between the heretical and some of the orthodox schools. If Kapila could assert the non-existence of a Supreme Being, and if Kaṇâda could attribute the primal action of eternal atoms to *adrishṭa*, I cannot see how there could be a marked difference of opinion between them and the heretics.”¹

The Bhagavad-Gîtâ is accounted most orthodox, but this is what it says of the Vedas (ii. 42-46):—“A flowery doctrine, promising the reward of works performed in this embodied state, presenting numerous ceremonies, with a view to future gratification and glory, is prescribed by unlearned men, devoted to the injunctions of the Veda, assertors of its exclusive importance, lovers of enjoyment, and seekers after paradise. The restless minds of the men who, through this flowery doctrine have become bereft of wisdom and are ardent in the pursuit of future gratification and glory, are not applied to contemplation. The Vedas have for their objects the three qualities; but be thou, Arjuna, free from these three qualities. . . . As great as is the use of a well which is surrounded on all sides by overflowing waters, so great [and no greater] is the use of the Vedas to a Brâhman endowed with true

¹ *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*, p. 73. For further discussion of this interesting question, see Wilson's *Essays on the Religion of the Hindus*, ii. 85-87.

knowledge.”¹ King Aśoka gave the death-blow to animal sacrifices in the third century before Christ, as various rock and pillar inscriptions bear witness; but the demolition of the rest of the fabric was effected by the orthodox philosophers, who regarded it as “inferior science!”

3. *The Upanishads.*

These are speculative tracts, of varying length, appended to the four Vedas. Max Müller describes them as “guesses at truth, frequently contradicting each other, yet all tending in one direction;” and adds that the keynote of the older ones is ‘know thy Self’—that is, “know thy true Self, that which underlies thine Ego, and find it and know it in the highest, the Eternal Self, the One without a Second, which underlies the whole world.”² This is true of the best of the Upanishads, namely, of those on which commentaries have been written by Śāṅkarāchārya; but when we remember that the Self which they profess to reveal is nothing more than the unconscious, unintelligent, and impersonal Thing described above, there would seem to be very little of the sublime in their teaching. Many of the shorter ones are purely sectarian, and were evidently put forth by followers of Rāma, Kṛishṇa, Śiva, Gaṇapati, and other deities. One of them, the *Kālāgnirudra*, sings the praises of the *tripundra*,—whilst another lauds the yellow earth called *Gopīchandana*. Professor Cowell justly remarks that they have no system or method, and that there runs through them an unmistakable spirit of Pantheism, often in its most offensive form.³ Yet, strange to say, the great reformer Rāmmohan Roy saw in them nothing but *mono-*

¹ Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, iii. 32.

² *Hibbert Lectures* for 1878, p. 317.

³ Elphinstone's *History of India*, p. 282.

theism, and, in the impersonal Brahma, a personal God. This is evident from his essays and translations published in England in 1832.

How many of these tracts there are it is difficult to say. The *Muktikā Upanishad* gives a list of 108, ten of which it assigns to the R̥gveda, nineteen to the Vājasaneyi-Samhitā, thirty-two to the Taittiriya-Samhitā, sixteen to the Sāmaveda, and thirty-one to the Atharvaveda; but this division seems incorrect.

Dr. Burnell says that in Southern India the Upanishads are always reckoned at 108, and he gives the total number extant in the whole of India, as 170.¹ Professor Weber, however, has counted as many as 235, but thinks it possible that, in some cases, the same Upanishad appears under different names.²

The number usually allotted to the Atharvaveda is fifty-two, and they are generally arranged in a particular order in the lists. Professor Bhāṇḍārkar thinks that the arrangement is not arbitrary, but represents some fact of literary history. The list is given in his Report on Sanskrit MSS. for the year 1883-84, but published in 1888. It is also found in Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*. In the library of the Deccan College at Poona, there is a set of Ātharvaṇa Upanishads, consisting of fifty-nine. The additional ones are—*Gopālatāpanī* (2), *Kṛishṇa*, *Vāsudeva*, *Hanumān*, *Rāma*, and *Mṛityulāngala*. Another fragmentary set in the same library gives the *Ātmaprabodha* as No. 44, and the *Śvetāśvatara* as No. 45. The *Mahānārāyaṇa* (34) takes the place of the two styled *Bṛihannārāyaṇa* in most lists.

¹ *Indian Antiquary*, vol. ii. p. 267.

² *Hist. of Indian Literature*, p. 155 (note).

The word *Upanishad* is derived by native authors from the root *shad*, 'to destroy' (preceded by the prepositions *upa*, 'near,' and *ni*, 'down'), and is held to be that body of teaching which destroys illusion and reveals the Absolute. Professor Max Müller, however, considers this explanation to be "wilfully perverse," and derives it from *sad*, 'to sit down,' "so that it would express the idea of session, or assembly of pupils sitting down near their teacher to listen to his instruction."¹

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. i. p. lxxx.

II.

As this tract has for its subject the Vedânta, and the præcognita¹ of *that* system prove *this* also to possess them, it is unnecessary to consider them separately. [But lest any one should not have read the large treatise, I may say that] the præcognita in that system are—

- I. The qualified person (*adhibikârin*).
- II. The subject (*vishaya*).
- III. The relation (*sambandha*).
- IV. The purpose (*prayojana*).

I. ‘*The qualified person*’ is the possessor of right knowledge; that is, one who, by reading the Vedas and Vedângas according to rule, either in this life or in a former one, has obtained a general idea of the meaning of the whole,—who, by performing the constant and occasional rites, the penances, and devotional exercises, and abstaining from things

¹ Ballantyne renders this by “moving considerations.” The original is *anubandha*.

done with desire of reward and from those forbidden, has got rid of all sin and so thoroughly cleansed his mind,—and who has acquired the four means.

‘The things done with desire of reward’ (or ‘optional things,’ *kâmya*) are the Jyotishtoma sacrifice and other things of a similar kind, which are the means of procuring heaven and other desirable things.

The ‘forbidden things’ (*nishiddha*) are the slaying of a Brâhman and the like, which result in hell and other undesirable things.

The ‘constant rites’ (*nitya*) are the Sandhyâ prayers and the like, which cause ruin if left undone.

The ‘occasional rites’ (*naimittika*) are the birth-sacrifice following the birth of a son, and such like.

The ‘penances’ (*prâyaśchitta*) are the *Chândrâyana*¹ and others, which are used for the removal of sin.

The ‘devotional exercises’ (*upâsana*) are the system of Śaṇḍilya and the like, consisting of mental efforts directed towards Brahma with qualities.

¹ Three of my MSS. read *Kricchhrachândrâyana*.

The principal object of the constant and occasional rites and of the penances is the purification of the intellect; that of the devotional exercises is the concentration of the mind. As it is written in the Veda,¹ "Him, the Self, Brâhmaṇs seek to know by the reading of the Veda and by sacrifice;" and in the Smṛiti,² "By religious acts he destroys sin."

An incidental result of the constant and occasional rites and of the devotional exercises is the acquisition of the abode of the progenitors and of the abode of Brahma; as the Veda³ says, "By works, the abode of the progenitors; by knowledge, the abode of the gods."

The 'four means' (*sādhana*) are (a.) discrimination between eternal and non-eternal substances, (b.) indifference to the enjoyment of rewards here and hereafter, (c.) the possession of the six things—quiescence, self-restraint, &c., and (d.) desire for release.

(a.) 'Discrimination between eternal and non-eternal substances' is the discerning that Brahma is the only eternal substance, and that everything else is non-eternal.

(b.) 'Indifference to the enjoyment of rewards

¹ *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, 4. 4. 22.

² *Manu*, xii. 104.

³ *Bṛihad.*, 1. 5. 16

here or hereafter' is complete indifference to the enjoyment of the things of this life, such as garlands, perfumes, and other objects of sense,—and of those pertaining to the next world, such as nectar and other sensuous objects,—because, being the result of works, they are non-eternal.

(c.) 'Quiescence, self-restraint, &c.,' are quiescence, self-restraint, abstinence, endurance, contemplative concentration, and faith.

'Quiescence' is the restraining of the mind from objects of sense opposed to hearing, &c.

'Self-restraint' is the turning away of the external organs from objects opposed to that hearing.

'Abstinence' is the continued abstaining of the external organs from sensuous objects opposed to that hearing, after they have been turned away from them; or it may be the abandonment of prescribed acts in a legitimate manner [*i.e.*, by becoming an ascetic].

'Endurance' is bearing the polarities of heat and cold, &c.

'Contemplative concentration' is the fixing of the restrained mind on hearing and such like things which are helpful to it.

‘Faith’ is belief in the utterances of the spiritual teacher, and of the Vedânta.

(d.) ‘Desire for release’ is the longing for emancipation.

A man of this kind, the possessor of right knowledge, is ‘*a qualified person.*’ As the Veda¹ says, “The tranquil, restrained man, &c. ;” and as it is said elsewhere,² “To the seeker of emancipation, who is tranquil in mind, who has subdued his senses, whose sins are gone, who conforms to the teaching of the Śâstras and is virtuous, and who, long and continuously, has followed a teacher, is this to be taught.”

II. ‘*The subject*’ is the unity of souls and of Brahma, as pure intelligence, a fact which can be demonstrated ; for this is the purport of all Vedânta treatises.

III. ‘*The relation*’ between that unity, the thing to be proved, and the proof derived from the Upanishads which set it forth, is that which is characterised as the condition of ‘the explainer and thing to be explained.’

IV. ‘*The purpose*’ is the removal of the igno-

¹ *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, 4. 4. 26.

² *Upadeśasahasî*, 324. (Three MSS. of the text read *satatam* in the last line, and three of the Commentary—*sakalam*. I have adopted the former.)

rance regarding the unity to be demonstrated, and the acquisition of the joy which is the essence of Brahma. As the Veda¹ says, "The knower of Self passes beyond sorrow;" and again,² "He who knows Brahma becomes Brahma."

As a man with a hot head goes to the water, so this qualified person, scorched by the fires of mundane existence, with its births, deaths, and other ills, takes a bundle of firewood in his hands and approaches a spiritual teacher versed in the Vedas and intent upon Brahma, and becomes his follower. As it is said in the Veda,³ "In order to know It, he should go with fuel in his hands to a teacher learned in the Vedas, and intent on Brahma."⁴ He, with great kindness, instructs him by the method of illusory attribution (*adhyāropa*), followed by its withdrawal (*apavāda*). As it is written in the Veda,⁵ "To him, on drawing nigh with truly calmed mind and sense subdued, that learned one should so expound, in truth, the Brahma lore, that he may know the true and undecaying Male."

¹ *Chhândogya*, 7. 1. 3.

² *Muṇḍaka*, 3. 2. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, 1. 2. 12.

⁴ In commenting on the foregoing passage, Śaṅkarāchārya lays stress on the need of a teacher, and says "*S'āstrajño'pi svātantryeṇa Brahmajñān-
veshaṇam na kuryāt*," "Even though a man know the scriptures, he should not attempt to acquire the knowledge of Brahma independently." See also *Mahābhārata*, 12. 327. 22, 23; and *Chhândogya-Upanishad*, 4. 9. 3.

⁵ *Muṇḍaka*, 1. 2. 13.

NOTES ON SECTION II.

1. *Præcognita.*

“With reference to the commencing of any scientific work, according to Hindu opinion, four questions present themselves:—(1) what qualifications are required to render one competent to enter upon the study?—(2) what is the subject-matter?—(3) what connection is there between the subject-matter and the book itself?—and (4) what inducement is there to enter upon the study at all? The answer to each of these questions is called an *anubandha*—a ‘bond of connection’ or ‘cause’—because, unless a man knows what a book is about, and whether he is competent to understand it, and what good the knowledge will do him, he cannot be expected to apply himself to the study of the book, instead of employing himself otherwise.”¹ This section is accordingly devoted to the elucidation of these four points and of others springing from them.

2. But it also shows the compromise made by the philosophers with the pre-existing systems of ritual and devotion. They retained them, but merely, they said, as means of purifying the intellect for the reception of the higher truths, a process similar to the polishing of a tarnished mirror so as to fit it to reflect an image.

“Whoever, therefore, hearing that the Vedântins believe in Brahma without qualities, infers that they reject Vishnu, Śiva, and the rest of the pantheon, and that they discountenance idolatry and such things, and that they count the

¹ *The Pandit* for July 1867, p. 48.

Purâṇas and similar writings false, labours under gross error.”¹ In fact, it is laid down in *Panchadaśī*, vi. 206–209, that any kind of god or demigod, or anything in the animal, vegetable, or mineral kingdom, may be properly worshipped as a portion of Īśvara, and that such worship will bring a reward proportioned to the dignity of the object worshipped.

Worship is natural to man; and in making a compromise with the theologians the philosophers merely acknowledged this fact. Their system, however, like that of Buddha, had no object of worship, or indeed anything “to elicit and sustain a religious life;” so they were compelled “to crave the help of polytheism, and to treat the foulest orgies and the cruellest rites of idolatry as acts of reasonable worship paid indirectly to the sole and supreme Being.”²

It is laid down, however, in *Panchadaśī*, iv. 43–46, that as soon as the knowledge of the truth is obtained, the sacred writings themselves, as a portion of the unreal dualism, are to be abandoned, just as a torch is extinguished when one has no further need of it, or as the husk is thrown away by one who merely wants the grain! The dishonesty of Pantheism is thus clearly seen. For “if it look upon the popular deities as mere fictions of the popular mind, its association with polytheism can only mean a conscious alliance with falsehood, the deliberate propagation of lies. If, on the other hand, it regard them as really manifestations of the Absolute Being, it must believe this on the authority of revelation or tradition,”³ the whole of which the Vedântist classes with unrealities!

¹ *Rational Refutation*, p. 195.

² *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 389.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

3. *'In this life or in a former one.'*

It is this tenet of a succession of births that furnishes the *raison d'être* of the systems of philosophy, as their professed aim is to provide a way of deliverance from them. The doctrine of metempsychosis still prevails in India, Ceylon, Burmah, Tibet, Tartary, and China, and is accepted, therefore, by the larger portion of the human race. It would be a source of much satisfaction to us if we could discover the time and place of its birth. It was not held by the Aryan family or by the early Indian settlers, for the Vedas recognise the continued existence of the soul after death in some heavenly sphere, and contain no distinct reference whatever to the fact of transmigration.¹ Its first appearance in orthodox writings is in the Chhândogya and Bṛihadâraṇyaka Upanishads, which are believed by Professor Weber to have been composed at about the same period, the former in the west of Hindustan, the latter in the east. He, however, refers them to a "comparatively recent date," and tells us that the doctrines promulgated in the latter by Yâjñavalkya are "completely Buddhistic."² That being the case, we may justly consider these two treatises to have been post-Buddhistic; and there then remains no ancient orthodox composition which can claim to have set forth the doctrine of transmigration prior to the appearance of Buddha. It is embodied, it is true, in Manu's Code of Laws, for which a very high antiquity has been claimed; but there can be no reasonable doubt that the present redaction of it was posterior to the rise of Buddhism, and some would even bring it down to as late a time as the third century before

¹ Wilson's *Essays on Sanskrit Literature*, iii. 345.

² *History of Indian Literature*, pp. 71, 73, 285.

Christ.¹ But even if it be true that the doctrine was first publicly taught by Buddha, it by no means follows that he was the originator of it, and that it had not been a matter of speculation long before his time. As a matter of fact, the theory of the transmigration of *soul* was assuredly not his, for he totally denied the existence of soul. What he taught was the transmigration of *karma*, that is, of the aggregate of all a man's actions in every state of existence in which he has lived.² According to him, a man is made up of five aggregates (Sanskrit, *skandha*; Pâli, *khandha*) of properties or qualities, viz., 1. *Rûpa*, organised body, comprising twenty-eight divisions; 2. *Vedanâ*, sensation, comprising eighteen divisions; 3. *Sañjñâ*, perception, comprising six divisions; 4. *Samskāra*, discrimination, comprising fifty-two divisions; and 5. *Vijnāna*, consciousness, comprising eighty-nine divisions. At death, these five are broken up and dispersed, never to be reunited. But, besides *karma*, there is another property inherent in all sentient beings, named *upādāna*, or 'cleaving to existing objects;' and these two survive the dispersion of the aggregates and produce a new being. "By *upādāna* a new existence is produced, but the means of its operation is controlled by the *karma* with which it is connected. It would sometimes appear that *upādāna* is the efficient cause of reproduction, and that at other times it is *karma*. But in all cases it is the *karma* that appoints whether the being to be produced shall be an insect in the sunbeam, a worm in the earth, a fish in the

¹ Elphinstone's *History of India*, 6th ed., by Cowell, p. 249. The most probable date of the death of Buddha is 477 B.C. See this point discussed in *Hibbert Lectures*, 1878, p. 134.

² Hardy's *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, p. 164.

sea, a fowl in the air, a beast in the forest, a man, a restless *dewa* or *brahma* of the celestial world.”¹

Such is the Buddhist notion of transmigration; and it would be more reasonable to suppose it to have been an adaptation of the usual theory than to regard the latter as modified from it.

The other Asiatic countries named above obtained the doctrine, together with the rest of Buddhism, from India, and can therefore give us no help in our search. Turning to Europe, we find the metempsychosis amongst the philosophy of Pythagoras, who is supposed to have been born some time between 604 and 520 B.C.² His life is “shrouded in the dim magnificence of legends,” amongst which we should doubtless class the theory of his having visited India. Still the similarity of much of his system to that of Indian philosophers is very curious, and Colebrooke thought that it was borrowed from them.

With regard, however, to the supposed Eastern origin of much of that philosopher’s teaching, Mr. George Henry Lewes thus wrote: “Every dogma in it has been traced to some prior philosophy. Not a vestige will remain to be called the property of the teacher himself if we restore to the Jews, Indians, Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phœnicians, nay, even Thracians, those various portions which he is declared to have borrowed from them. All this pretended plagiarism we incline to think extremely improbable. Pythagoras was a successor of Anaximander, and his doctrines, in so far as we can gather their leading tendency, were but a continuation of that abstract and

¹ Hardy’s *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 409.

² Buddha is supposed to have lived eighty years, and so was probably born about 557 B.C. *Ibid.*, p. 366.

deductive philosophy of which Anaximander was the originator."¹

But this by no means exhausts the field for inquiry, for Egypt is known to have held the theory of transmigration, possibly before it was taught in Greece; but whether it was introduced from without, or evolved from the inner consciousness of the nation itself, we cannot determine. We have to acknowledge ourselves completely baffled, then, in our search for the birthplace of this important dogma; and whether it originated in the West or in the East, or arose simultaneously in both worlds, it is absolutely impossible to say, and we must be content to leave the question in the thick haze which impenetrably enshrouds it.

4. '*Reading the Veda,*' &c.

The study of the Veda and the practice of its ritual being prerequisites to the initiation into the higher mysteries, the advantages offered by philosophy were beyond the reach of the masses, and for them something simpler and more attractive was provided. But the real object of the provision thus made, whether for the learned or the ignorant, for the few or the many, was to put forth a counter-attraction to the system of Śākya Muni.

When we think of the deliverance that had been offered by Buddhism to the priest-ridden communities of India, of the vast number of its adherents, and of its great power which so effectually checked Brâhman supremacy for centuries, it seems strange that it should ever have succumbed, and have been driven beyond the Himālayas. Yet so it was. Possibly its very success

¹ *History of Philosophy*, 4th edition, i. 26.

engendered indolence and inactivity on the part of those who ought actively to have maintained and propagated it;¹ or its extreme simplicity and strict morality may at length have proved irksome and rendered it unpopular;² or the weakness necessarily inherent in a religion *without a God* to be loved and worshipped may have been at length manifested in it, and so have opened the way for the astute Brâhmans, who were ever on the watch for opportunities for recovering their long-lost sway. But be this as it may, the opportunity came, and the means employed for eradicating the heresy were twofold, namely, persecution and the introduction of a sensuous and attractive worship.

The former is supposed to have been commenced as early as the third century of our era, but to have been actively and more successfully carried on during the fifth and sixth centuries. The probability of the persecution of the latter period is remarkably strengthened by the fact that Buddhism received a fresh impulse in China in A.D. 519, was introduced into the Corea in A.D. 530, into Japan in A.D. 540-550, and into Java during the sixth and seventh centuries, which witnessed the arrival of large numbers of Hindu emigrants.³ We have evidence of the fact of the decline of Buddhism in those early centuries from the diary of the Chinese pilgrim Hiouen Thsang, who came to India in the year 629 A.D. to study original Buddhist works, and during his residence of fourteen or fifteen years travelled over a great part of the country.

He found large numbers of flourishing monasteries,

¹ Wilson's *Essays on the Religion of the Hindus*, ii. 367.

² Weber's *History of Indian Literature*, p. 289 (note).

³ Wilson's *Essays on Sanskrit Literature*, iii. 198.

conspicuous amongst which was that of Nālanda (north-east of Gayâ), which contained 10,000 resident monks, some of whom were "visitors from all parts of India, who had come to study the abstruser Buddhist books under its renowned teachers;" but, on the other hand, there were vast numbers deserted and in ruins, whilst Hindu temples abounded and 'heretics' swarmed in every city.¹

The struggle was renewed, at the end of the seventh century, by the famous Mīmāṃsaka, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who was regarded as "an incarnation of Kârtikeya, the object of whose descent was the extirpation of the Saugatas" (Buddhists), and ended in the complete expulsion of the latter from the Deckan. The great controversialist Śaṅkara Âchârya, too, who lived a century later, is supposed by some to have used sterner weapons than the pen in demolishing heretics; but, on the other hand, his "mild character" and "uniformly gentle and tolerant" disposition, as well as the absence from his writings of all mention of the persecution of his opponents, have been brought forward in disproof of the charge.² Notwithstanding the efforts of their enemies to uproot them, the Buddhists were still found on the Coromandel Coast in the eighth and ninth centuries, and in Gujarât, and on the throne of Bengal in the twelfth century; but after that they were heard of no more. In the fourteenth century they were not found south of Kashmîr, and by the sixteenth century they appear to have been rarely met with even there.³

The attempt to suppress Buddhism by fire and sword was supplemented, however, by other measures, in order

¹ Elphinstone's *History of India*, 6th ed., by Cowell, pp. 288-299.

² *Essays on Sanskrit Literature*, iii. 191-197.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

to place reviving Brâhmanical supremacy on a firm basis. These, somewhat after the fashion of Balaam's tactics for the seduction and ruin of Israel, consisted of the introduction of an extremely sensuous and debasing form of Kṛishṇa-worship, together with the cults of certain female deities.¹ "The Brahmans saw, on regaining their supremacy after the fall of the rival school, that it would be impossible to enlist the popular sympathy in their favour without some concessions to the Śûdras. They accordingly pitched on the well-known, and perhaps already deified, character of Kṛishṇa, and set it up as an object of universal worship. And in order to make it the more fascinating to the popular mind, and to give that mind a strong impulse in a direction the very opposite of Buddhism, they invested their new god with those infirmities of the flesh from which Śâkya Muni is said to have been somewhat unnaturally free. The rude mind of the populace, devoid of education, is easily led in the direction of sensuality, and whereas Buddha had observed rigid chastity in the midst of several thousand damsels resident in his own palace, Kṛishṇa was represented as the very antithesis of Buddha, deliberately going about to seek, seduce, carry off, or procure by other means many thousands of females from different parts of the country. . . . Whatever ideas, expressive of the divine majesty, they could themselves imagine, and whatever sentiments, borrowed from other quarters, struck their fancies as suitable for a popular system, they freely received in the construction of their new idol. And thus the very character which had injured so many husbands and stained the purity of so many households, was otherwise described

¹ Weber's *History of Indian Literature*, p. 289 (note).

as the Lord of sacrifices, the greatest destroyer of sin, and the deliverer of the world.”¹ The success which attended this scheme was very marked, and continues undiminished to this day.

The time of the introduction of Kṛishṇa-worship having, however, formed a subject of debate amongst scholars, it may be well to dwell upon it further. It should be stated at the outset that there is an important difference between the mere deification of Kṛishṇa and his elevation to the rank of supreme deity with the sensual worship condemned above. References to the first, that is, to his apotheosis, have been found by Professor Bhāṇḍārkar in the Mahābhāshya, which he assigns to the second cen-

¹ K. M. Banerjea's *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy*, p. 520. In *Bhagavad Gītā*, iv. 8, Krishna is made to speak of himself as appearing in every age for the complete deliverance of the saintly, the overthrow of the wicked, and the establishment of righteousness; and in xviii. 66 as the deliverer from all sin! The Bhāgavata Purāṇa is said to have been related by the Sage Śuka to King Parikshit, who, after listening to the account of Krishna's debaucheries, is said to have inquired how it was that he who became incarnate “for the establishment of virtue” and the repression of vice, and who was “the expounder, author, and guardian of the bulwarks of righteousness,” was guilty of such corrupt practices. The reply to this very proper question was as follows:—“The transgression of virtue and the daring acts which are witnessed in superior beings (*īśvarāṇām*) must not be charged as faults to these glorious persons. . . . Let no one other than a superior being ever even in thought practise the same. . . . The word of superior beings is true, and so also their conduct is sometimes [correct]: let a wise man observe their command, which is right. . . . Since Munis are uncontrolled and act as they please, how can there be any restraint upon him (the Supreme Deity) when he has voluntarily assumed a body?” “This passage is followed by an assurance on the part of the author of the Purāṇa that the person who listens with faith to the narrative of Krishna's sports with the cowherd's wives, and who repeats it to others, shall attain to strong devotion to that deity, and shall speedily be freed from love, that disease of the heart. A remarkable instance of homœopathic cure certainly!”—*Muir's Sanskrit Texts*, iv. 50 f. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, x. 33, 27-40.

ture before Christ;¹ but the latter, the Kṛishṇa-cultus proper, according to Weber, is not found before the fifth or sixth century of our era;² and its best authority, the Bhâgavata Purâṇa (book x.), is ascribed by Colebrooke and "many learned Hindus" to the twelfth century.³

In the Gopâlatâpani Upanishad, too, we find Kṛishṇa, "the beloved of the *gopîs*," set forth as the supreme deity; but this work is justly supposed by Professor Weber to be very modern,⁴ and Colebrooke regarded its claim to antiquity as "particularly suspicious." His remarks on this whole question are worthy of attention. He says:—"Although the *Râmatâpanîya* be inserted in all the collections of Upanishads which I have seen; and the *Gopâlatâpanîya* appear in some, yet I am inclined to doubt their genuineness, and to suspect that they have been written in times modern when compared with the remainder of the Vedas. This suspicion is chiefly grounded on the opinion that the sects which now worship Râma and Kṛishṇa as incarnations of Vishnu are comparatively new. I have not found in any other part of the Vedas the least trace of such a worship. . . . According to the notions which I entertain of the real history of the Hindu religion, the worship of Râma and of Kṛishṇa by the *Vaishnavas*, and that of Mahâdeva and Bhavânî by the *Śaivas* and *Śâktas*, have been generally introduced since the persecution of the *Baudhas* and *Jainas*. . . . The overthrow of the sect of Buddha in India has not effected the full revival of the religious system inculcated in the Vedas. Most of what is there taught is now obsolete, and, in its stead, new orders of religious devotees

¹ *Indian Antiquary*, ii. 60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 285.

³ *Miscellaneous Essays*, i. 94.

⁴ *History of Indian Literature*, p. 169.

have been instituted, and new forms of religious ceremonies have been established. Rituals founded on the *Purāṇas* and observances borrowed from a worse source, the *Tantras*, have, in a great measure, antiquated the institutions of the Vedas. In particular, the sacrificing of animals before the idols of Kâlî has superseded the less sanguinary practice of the *Yajna*; and the adoration of Râma and of Kṛishṇa has succeeded to that of the elements and planets. If this opinion be well founded, it follows that the Upanishads in question have probably been composed in later times, since the introduction of those sects which hold Râma and Gopâla in peculiar veneration."¹

The date of that most important treatise the Bhagavad Gîtâ, in which Kṛishṇa is regarded as the Supreme, has not been determined. On account of remarkable resemblances in it to some of the ideas and expressions of the Bible, Dr. Lorinser, writing in 1869, asserted that it was probably indebted to the latter for them. He was of opinion that the Brâhmans borrowed Christian ideas from the early Christian communities in India and applied them to Kṛishṇa.² The existence of a Christian Church in India in the first or second century, as maintained by Dr. Lorinser, has not, however, been satisfactorily established. According to Dr. Burnell, "the Manichæan mission to India in the third century A.D. is the only historical fact that we know of in relation to Christian missions in India before we get as low as the sixth century."³ However this may be, the sudden appearance on the Hindu horizon of *bhakti*, as distinguished from the

¹ *Miscellaneous Essays*, i. 99-101.

² *Indian Antiquary*, ii. 283.

³ *Ibid.*, iv 182.

older *śraddhā*,¹ is a fact the explanation of which is almost impossible if a previous contact with Christianity is denied.

Dr. Lorinser's position has been vehemently assailed by Mr. Kāshināth Telang of Bombay, but not, in my opinion, with complete success. It has been disputed, too, by Professor Windisch of Heidelberg, who, while admitting that "some surprising parallel passages" have been adduced, considers "the immediate introduction of the Bible into the explanation of the Bhagavad Gītā" to be premature.²

Professor Weber regards Dr. Lorinser's attempt as "overdone," but adds that "he is not in principle opposed to the idea which that writer maintains."³ Indeed, this eminent scholar has declared his own belief in the indebtedness of the Kṛishṇa-cult to Christianity, as the following quotation will show: "(1.) The reciprocal action and mutual influence of gnostic and Indian conceptions in the first centuries of the Christian era are evident, however difficult it may be at present to say what in each is peculiar to it or borrowed from the other. (2.) The worship of Krishna as sole god is one of the latest phases of Indian religious systems, of which there is no trace in Varāhamihira, who mentions Krishna, but only in passing. (3.) This worship of Krishna as sole god has no intelligible connection with his earlier position in the Brahmanical legends. There is a gap between the two which apparently nothing but the supposition of an external influence can account for. (4.) The legend in the *Mahābhārata* of Śvetadwīpa, and the revelation which is made there to Nārada by Bhagavat himself, shows that

¹ Cowell's *Aphorisms of Śāṇḍilya*, p. viii.

² *Indian Antiquary*, iv. 79.

³ *Ibid.*

Indian tradition bore testimony to such an influence. (5.) The legends of Krishna's birth, the solemn celebration of his birthday, in the honours of which his mother, Devaki, participates, and finally his life as a herdsman, a phase the furthest removed from the original representation, can only be explained by the influence of Christian legends, which, received one after the other by individual Indians in Christian lands, were modified to suit their own ways of thought, and may also have been affected by the labours of individual Christian teachers down to the latest times."¹

The Mahâbhârata, in which the Gitâ lies imbedded, is the work of "widely distant periods;" and though some portion of it is said to have existed in Patanjali's time,² that is, in the second century before Christ, its present redaction was probably not complete until "some centuries after the commencement of our era."³ Chronology, therefore, furnishes no disproof of the theory advanced above as to the origin of Krishna-worship.

5. '*The Jyotishṭoma sacrifice.*'

This appears to have been a cycle of seven sacrifices, of which one called Agnishtoma was the first. Dr. Haug says that in many places the term Jyotishṭoma is equivalent to Agnishtoma, which is the model of all Soma sacrifices of one day's duration. The ceremonies connected with the Agnishtoma sacrifice lasted for five days, but those of the first four days were merely introductory to the crowning rites of the last day, on which the squeezing, offering, and drinking of the Soma juice took

¹ *Indian Antiquary*, ii. 285.

² *Ibid.*, i. 350.

³ Weber's *History of Indian Literature*, p. 188; and Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, iv. 169.

place at the morning, midday, and evening libations. The Soma ceremony is said to have been the holiest rite in the whole Brahmanical service.¹

6. ‘*The slaying of a Brâhman.*’

There are numerous references in Manu’s code to the awfulness of this crime; and the consequences of even a common assault on his sacred person are something terrific. The following are examples:—

“That twice-born man who merely assaults a Brâhman with intent to hurt, wanders about in the hell called *Tâmisra* for a hundred years; whilst he who ‘of malice aforethought’ strikes him, even with a blade of grass, goes through twenty-one different births of a low order” (*Manu*, iv. 165, 166).

“A king should never slay a Brâhman, though convicted of every crime under the sun; he should expel him from the country, unharmed, with all his property. There is no greater crime in the world than the slaughter of a Brâhman; a king, therefore, should not even contemplate it with his mind” (viii. 380, 381).

“The (unintentional) slayer of a Brâhman should make a hut for himself in the forest, and dwell there for twelve years for purification, living on alms, and having the head of his victim set up as a banner” (xi. 72).

“He who, with murderous intent, merely threatens a Brâhman with a stick goes to hell for a hundred years; whilst he who actually strikes him goes for a thousand years” (xi. 206).

7. ‘*The Sandhyâ prayers.*’

“Let him daily, after rinsing his mouth, observe the two

¹ See Haug’s *Âitareya Brâhmaṇa*, i. 59-63, ii. 240.

Sandhyâs, repeating the Sâvitri in a pure place according to rule" (*Manu*, ii. 222).

Colebrooke says: "The duty of bathing in the morning and at noon, if the man be a householder, and in the evening also, if he belong to an order of devotion, is inculcated by pronouncing the strict observance of it no less efficacious than a rigid penance in expiating sins, especially the early bath in the months of Mâgha, Phâlguna, and Kârtika; and the bath being particularly enjoined as a salutary ablution, he is permitted to bathe in his own house, but without prayers, if the weather or his own infirmities prevent his going forth; or he may abridge the ceremonies and use fewer prayers if a religious duty or urgent business require his early attendance. The regular bath consists of ablutions followed by worship and by the inaudible recitation of the Gâyatri with the names of the worlds."¹ The sacred Gâyatri or Sâvitri is this: '*Tat savitur vareṇyam bhargo devasya dhīmahi dhīyo yo nah prachodayât*,' which Colebrooke thus translates: "Let us meditate on the adorable light of the divine ruler (Savitri); may it guide our intellects."

8. '*The Chândrâyana*.'

This, to quote from Professor Monier Williams' Dictionary, is "a religious observance or expiatory penance regulated by the moon's age. It consists in diminishing the daily consumption of food every day by one mouthful for the dark half of the month, beginning with fifteen at the full moon until the quantity is reduced to zero at the new moon, and then increasing it in like manner during the fortnight of the moon's increase." This kind is called by *Manu* (xi. 216, Scholium), *Pipīlikāmadhya*, 'that

¹ *Miscellaneous Essays*, i. 142.

which has the middle thin like an ant.' If, however, the rite commences at the new moon, and goes from zero up to fifteen and then decreases again, it is called *Yavamadhya*, 'that which is thick in the middle like a barley-corn' (xi. 217). There are two other varieties called *Yati* and *Śīśu*. The former consists of eating eight mouthfuls a day at midday and fasting during the morning and evening for a whole month; the latter, of eating four mouthfuls in the morning and four in the evening every day for a month. A fifth variety, which appears to have no name, consists of eating 240 mouthfuls during the month, to be divided into daily portions at the will of the eater. Thus, as the Scholiast says, he may one day eat ten mouthfuls, another five, another sixteen, and another none at all, and so on (xi. 218-220).

9. '*The system of Śāṇḍilya*' (*Śāṇḍilyavidyā*).

This is probably the doctrine, ascribed to that sage, which forms the 14th Chapter of the Third Book of the *Chhândogya-Upanishad*. For a translation of it, see Gough's *Philosophy of the Upanishads* (Trübner's Oriental Series), p. 62.

10. '*Longing for emancipation*.'

The idea of *mukti* is not found in the first two divisions of the Veda, but is fully and unmistakably developed in the Śvetâśvatara, the Nṛsiṃhottaratâpani, and other Upanishads. "The Brâhmanas had certainly been pondering it for some time before the rise of Buddhism. It was probably they themselves who instilled it into the mind of Śâkya. It was perhaps their own aspiration after something better than the degrading pleasures of Indra's territories that first suggested the futility of rites and ceremonies to the fertile imagination of the young prince

of Kapilavastu. But it was the prince himself who appears to have imparted a coherent shape to the doctrine, which, in some of the pre-Buddhistic Upanishads, appears in a chaotic state of disconnected fragments, not unfrequently by the side of the very contrary idea of sensuous enjoyments. Śākya appears to have first separated the two by contending that rites and ceremonies do not contribute to our highest good, and that it was *nirvāṇa*¹ alone which could secure our final escape from the miseries of sensuous life. In post-Buddhistic writings the notion of emancipation which pervades the philosophy of the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya, and the Vedānta, appears in a consistent form as distinct from that of heavenly enjoyment. *Swarga* and *apawarga* are always contrasted."²

II. 'The qualified person.'

The text shows that in order to qualify for initiation into the esoteric doctrines, the aspirant had to go through a long preparatory course. It may be interesting to compare with it that which the pupils of Pythagoras were required to pass through before receiving instruction in his wisdom. "For five years the novice was condemned to silence. Many relinquished the task in despair; they were unworthy of the contemplation of pure wisdom. Others, in whom the tendency to loquacity was observed to be less, had the period commuted. Various humiliations had to be endured; various experiments were made of their powers of self-denial. By these Pythagoras judged whether they were worldly-minded, or whether they were fit to be admitted into the sanctuary of science. Having purged their souls of the baser particles by purifications, sac-

¹ See this explained in Childers' *Pāli Dictionary*, s.v. *Nibbānam*.

² *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*, p. 325. See also Wilson's *Works*, ii. 113.

rifices, and initiations, they were admitted to the sanctuary, where the higher part of the soul was purged by the knowledge of truth, which consists in the knowledge of immaterial and eternal things.”¹

12. ‘*Illusory attribution, &c.*’ (*adhyāropāpavāda*).

In order to describe the pure abstraction Brahma, the teacher attributes to him, or superimposes on him, certain qualities which in reality do not belong to him, and then afterwards withdrawing them, teaches that the residuum is the undifferenced Absolute.

“When the Vedântins speak of the origin of the world, they do not believe its origin to be true. This mode of expression they call false imputation (*adhyāropa*). It consists in holding for true that which is false, in accommodation to the intelligence of the uninitiated. At a further stage of instruction, when the time has arrived for propounding the esoteric view, the false imputation is gainsaid, and this gainsaying is termed rescission² (*apavāda*).”

13. I will conclude the notes on this section with the following extract:—“If these rules of initiation be truthful, then the doctrine of one being is necessarily falsified, for they presuppose the existence of the *guru* and of all things which are necessary for the performance of the Vedic ritual; and if the rules are themselves illusory, the Vedântic initiation must itself be an illusion; and if the initiation be false, the indoctrination must be false too; for he only gets knowledge who has got an *āchārya*. The Vedânt will not allow that its grand consummation can be brought about without a qualified tutor. If there be no *āchārya*, there can be no teaching; and if the in-

¹ Lewes' *History of Philosophy*, i. 22.

² *Rational Refutation*, p. 209.

doctrination is a delusion, the conclusion of this spiritual exercise, *i.e.*, *mukti*, must be the grandest of delusions; and the whole system of Vedântism, all its texts and sayings, its precepts and promises, its *âchârya* and *adhi-kâri*, are therefore built like a house (as Râmânûja suggests) upon an imaginary mathematical line.”¹

¹ *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*, p. 421.

III.

ILLUSORY attribution is the attributing to the real of that which is unreal; as a snake is imagined in a rope which is not a snake.

The '*real*' is Brahma, existent, intelligence, and joy, eternal, without a second. The '*unreal*' is the whole mass of unintelligent things, beginning with ignorance.

'*Ignorance*,' they say, is something not describable as existent or non-existent, an entity, composed of the three qualities, antagonistic to knowledge.

[Its existence is established] by one's own consciousness of being ignorant, and also by the Veda,¹ [which speaks of it as] "the own power of God, concealed by its emanations."²

¹ *Śvetāśvatara*, I. 3.

² Literally, 'by its qualities,' which Śāṅkarācārya says means "by earth, &c., which are the products of Prakṛiti" (*svagunaiḥ prakṛitkāryabhūtaiḥ 2ṛithirvyādhibhiḥ*).

NOTES ON SECTION III.

1. 'The real' (*vastu*).

The characteristics of Brahma have already been considered in the opening notes, and it is in accordance with the doctrine of existences, as there explained, that Brahma is here declared to be the only reality. All else is 'unreal' (*avastu*), and imagined by ignorance. This is plainly put in the *Adhyâtma-Rāmāyaṇa*, (Yuddhakāṇḍa vi. 49, 50):—"The entire universe, movable and immovable, comprising bodies, intellects, and the organs, everything that is seen or heard, from Brahmâ down to a tuft of grass, is that which is called Matter (*prakṛiti*), is that which is known as Illusion."

The phenomenal is got rid of in this simple way, by quietly ignoring the evidence of the senses; but the non-duality thus established is purely imaginary. For "even appearances or illusions are phenomena which require to be explained, and they cannot be explained on the hypothesis of absolute unity. They imply that besides the absolute being there are *minds* which can be haunted by appearances, and which can be deluded into believing that these appearances are realities."¹

It has been already stated that the teaching of the earlier Upanishads was a *parināmarāda*, not a *māyārāda* or *vivarttarāda*. Whence, then, did this theory of the unreality of all things arise? The most probable answer is, that it was adopted from the Buddhists, the great supporters of Idealism. This was the opinion of Vijnâna

¹ *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 419.

Bhikshu, the learned commentator on the Śāṅkhya philosophy, who flourished about 300 years ago,¹ and who wrote of the “quasi-Vedantins” of his time as “upstart disguised Buddhists, advocates of the theory of Mâyâ,” and quoted a passage from the Padma Purāṇa² where the doctrine of Mâyâ is also stigmatised as nothing but disguised Buddhism.³ The Śvetâśvatara is said to be the oldest Upanishad in which the illusory nature of phenomena is plainly taught, and that tract is evidently post-Buddhistic. In the preface to his translation of it, Dr. Roer says that it “does not belong to the series of the more ancient Upanishads, or of those which preceded the foundation of the philosophical systems; for it shows, in many passages, an acquaintance with them, introduces the Vedānta, Śāṅkhya, and Yoga by their very names—mentions the reputed founder of the Śāṅkhya, Kapila, and appears even to refer to doctrines which have been always considered as heterodox. . . . As the mythological views of the Śvetâśvatara are those of a later time, when the worship of Śiva and of the divine Śaktis or energies had gained ground, in contradistinction to the ancient Upanishads, where only the gods of the Vedas are introduced, so also its philosophical doctrine refers to a more modern period.” In his opinion, it was composed not very long before the time of Śāṅkarâchârya, who is thought to have flourished in the eighth century of our era.⁴

2. ‘Ignorance’ (*ajñāna*).

This is here synonymous with Nescience (*avidyā*) and

¹ Preface to Hall’s *Śāṅkhya Sāra*, p. 37 (*note*).

² This work is supposed by Professor H. H. Wilson to have been composed, in part, in the twelfth century. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, vol. i. p. xxxiv.

³ *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*, pp. 309–313. *Śāṅkhya-pravachana bhāṣya*, p. 29.

⁴ Colebrooke’s *Essays*, i. 357.

Illusion (*māyā*), and though called the material cause of the universe, nevertheless heads the list of unrealities! Indeed it has been said that "the tenet of the falseness of Ignorance is the very keystone of the Vedānta!"¹ Its properties are the following:—

(a.) '*Not describable as existent or non-existent.*'

If allowed to have true existence, dualism of course ensues; and if it be said to be non-existent, it falls into the same category as a hare's horn, the son of a barren woman, and such like absolute nonentities, and no causation could then be attributed to it. So, to avoid the dilemma, it is said to be neither the one nor the other. Howbeit, it is acknowledged to have a practical existence, and to have been eternally associated with Brahma;² and, as a matter of fact, Brahma and Mâyâ are the exact counterpart of the Purusha and Prakṛiti of the Sāṅkhya, which is a professedly dualistic system.

A native writer speaks of Illusion as "the inscrutable principle regulating the universe of phenomena, or rather the world itself regarded as ultimately inconceivable;"³ and, elsewhere, as "the mystery by which the absolute Brahma brings himself into relation to the universe;"⁴ but he allows that, after all, this is rather a confession of the mystery than a solution of it. By Śaṅkarāchārya it is defined as "the aggregate of all powers, causes, and effects." But a principle or power producing such palpable results as the universe, &c., must have a very real existence, however 'inscrutable' it may be; and the definition of the text is absolute nonsense. The philo-

¹ *Rational Refutation*, p. 193.

² *Ibid.*, p. 35 (note).

³ *The Pandit (new series)*, iii. 506.

⁴ *Journal of R. A. S. (new series)*, x. 38.

sopher Kapila discusses this point in some of the aphorisms of his first book:¹ "Not from Ignorance too [does the soul's bondage, as the Vedântists hold, arise], because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding. If it [ignorance] *be* [asserted by you to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedântic] tenet. And [if you assume Ignorance to be a reality, then] there would be a *duality* through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul,—which you asserters of *non-duality* cannot contemplate allowing]. If [the Vedântin alleges, regarding Ignorance, that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [we say] no, because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal]. [Possibly the Vedântin may remonstrate], 'We are not asserters of any six categories like the Vaiśeshikas and others [—like the Vaiśeshikas who arrange all things under six heads, and the Naiyâyikas who arrange them under sixteen;—'therefore we hold that there *is* such a thing as Ignorance, which is at once real and unreal, or (if you prefer it) which differs at once from the real and unreal, because this is established by proofs,' scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to *us*, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gautama's scheme of argumentative exposition. To which we reply], Even although this be not compulsory [that the categories be reckoned six or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent, else we come to the level of children, madmen, and the like."

¹ *Sāṅkhya Aphorisms*, translated by Dr. Ballantyne, pp. 6-8. It is interesting to note that Plato (who was born fifty years after the death of Buddha) regarded *opinion* as lying between the purely existent and the absolutely non-existent; as something "more dusky than knowledge, more luminous than ignorance." *Lewes' Hist. of Philosophy*, i. p. 250.

(b.) 'An entity' (*bhāvarūpa*).

This is laid down in opposition to the notion of the logicians that *ajñāna*, 'not-knowledge,' is merely the equivalent of *jñānābhāva*, 'absence of knowledge.'

(c.) 'Antagonistic to knowledge' (*jñānavirodhi*).

This may also mean, 'whose foe is knowledge,' that is, 'that which is capable of being destroyed by knowledge.' A man might argue, says the commentator, that Ignorance being, according to the Veda, 'unborn,' spread out everywhere like the ether, and having the semblance of reality, deliverance from its power and from transmigration is impossible; but it is not so, for notwithstanding the power of Ignorance, it nevertheless yields to the cognition of Brahma, as the darkness flees before the light. There can be no doubt, from what has been so far asserted of Ignorance, that the logicians have rightly defined it as 'absence of apprehension,' and that it is also 'misapprehension.' For further on we shall find two powers attributed to Ignorance, namely, those of 'concealment' (*āvaraṇa*) and 'projection' (*vikshepa*), which are nothing else than 'absence of apprehension,' and 'misapprehension,' respectively.¹

(d.) 'Composed of the three qualities' (*triguṇātma*).

This is stated, too, in Bhagavad Gītā, vii. 14 : "Inasmuch as this divine Mâyâ of mine, composed of the qualities, is hard to be surmounted, none but those who resort to me cross over it." The *Prakṛiti*, or 'Matter,' of the Sāṅkhya has been thus described:—"Nature is unintelligent substance, and is the material cause of the world. It consists of goodness, passion, and darkness in equal proportions. And here it should be borne in mind

¹ *Rational Refutation*, p. 248.

that it is not the goodness, passion, and darkness, popularly reckoned qualities or particular states of the soul, that are intended in the Sâmkhya. In it they are *unintelligent substances*. Otherwise, how could they be the material cause of earth and like gross things? ”¹

Every word of this applies to the Vedântic ‘Ignorance’ or ‘Illusion,’ which, in the Śvetâśvatara Upanishad (iv. 10) is called Prakṛiti, or matter, and which is held to be the material cause of the world.

How this fact is to be reconciled with the previous portions of the definition is for the Vedântist to explain, if he can!

¹ *Rational Refutation*, p. 42. I am disposed to think that it is better to leave the word *Prakṛiti* untranslated. At any rate, ‘Nature’ seems hardly an adequate rendering.

IV.

THIS Ignorance is treated as one or as multiplex, according as it is regarded as a collective or distributive aggregate. Just as, when regarding a collection of trees as a whole, we speak of them as one thing, namely, a forest; or as, when regarding a collection of waters as a whole, we call them a lake, so when we look at the aggregate of the ignorances residing in individual souls and seeming to be manifold, we regard them as one. As it is said in the Veda,¹ “[The one, unborn, individual soul approaches] the one, unborn (Prakṛiti).”

This collective aggregate [of Ignorances], having as its associate (*upādhi*) that which is most excellent,² abounds in pure goodness. Intelligence³ associated with it, having the qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, and universal control, indiscrete, is called the internal ruler, the cause of the world, and Íśvara; because it is the illuminator of

¹ *Śvetāśvatara*, iv. 5.

² Namely, the *whole* of that portion of Brahma which is associated with ignorance.

³ *Chaitanya*.

the whole of Ignorance.¹ As the Veda² says, "Who knows all [generally], who knows everything [particularly]."

This totality [of Ignorance], being the cause of all things, is Îśvara's causal body. It is also called 'the sheath of bliss,' because it is replete with bliss, and envelops all things like a sheath; and 'dreamless sleep,' because everything reposes in it,—on which account it is also regarded as the scene of the dissolution of all subtile and gross bodies.

As, when regarding a forest as a distributive aggregate of trees, there is a perception of its manifoldness, which is also perceived in the case of a lake regarded as a distributive aggregate of waters,—so, when viewing Ignorance distributively, we perceive it to be multiplex. As the Veda³ says, "Indra, by his supernatural powers, appears multi-form."

Thus, then, a thing is regarded as a collective or distributive aggregate according as it is viewed as a whole or as a collection of parts.

¹ There seems to be no manuscript authority for the words *asya sarvajnatvam* which appear here in all the editions.

² *Muṇḍaka*, I. 1. 9.

³ *Rigveda*, 6. 47. 18.

Distributive ignorance, having a humble¹ associate, abounds in impure goodness. Intelligence associated with it, having the qualities of parviscience and parvipotence, is called Prâjua,² owing to its being the illuminator of one Ignorance only. The smallness of its intelligence is because its illuminating power is limited by its associate's want of clearness.³

This [distributive Ignorance] is the individual's causal body, because it is the cause of the making of 'I,' &c. It is also called 'the sheath of bliss,' because it abounds in bliss and covers like a sheath; and 'dreamless sleep,' because all things repose in it,—on which account it is said to be the scene of the dissolution of the subtile and gross body.

At that time, both Îśvara and Prâjua experience bliss by means of the very subtile modifications of Ignorance lighted up by Intelligence. As the Veda⁴ says, "Prâjua, whose sole inlet is the intellect, enjoys bliss." And, as is proved by the

¹ Namely, that small underlying portion of Brahma which forms the individual soul.

² This word is here made to mean a 'limited intelligence,' such as each individual is. In the sixth verse of the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*, however, it is described as "almighty, omniscient, &c.;" and Śankarâchârya defines *Prâjua* as meaning one who has knowledge of the past and future, and of all objects.

³ So all the MSS. and Böhlingk's edition.

⁴ *Māṇḍūkya*, 5.

experience of one who on rising says, "I slept pleasantly, I was conscious of nothing."

Between these two, the collective and distributive aggregates [of Ignorance], there is no difference; just as there is none between a forest and its trees, or between a lake and its waters.

Nor is there any difference between Īśvara and Prâjña, who are associated respectively with these [collective and distributive aggregates of Ignorance]; just as there is none between the ether appropriated [i.e., the space occupied] by the forest and that appropriated by the trees composing it,—or between the sky reflected in the lake, and that reflected in its waters. As it is said in the Veda,¹ "This [Prâjña] is the lord of all."

As there is for the forest and its trees, and for the ether appropriated to each, and for the lake and its waters and the ether reflected in each, an unappropriated ether as their substrate,—so too, for those two Ignorances and for Intelligence associated with them, there is an unassociated Intelligence which is their substrate.² It is called *the*

¹ *Māṇḍūkya*, 6.

² The commentator *Rāmānirītha* points out that though ether is not the substrate of the forest or of the lake, as it is not their material cause, yet, as they could not exist without space, it is called their substrate. Vide *The Paṇḍit* for October 1872, p. 130.

Fourth. As it is said in the Veda,¹ “They consider that blissful, secondless one to be the Fourth.”

This one, the Fourth, pure intelligence, when not discerned as separate from Ignorance, and Intelligence associated with it, like a red-hot iron ball [viewed without discriminating between the iron and the fire], is the literal meaning of the great sentence [‘That art Thou’]; but when discerned as separate, it is the meaning that is *indicated*.

This Ignorance has two powers, namely, that of (a) *envelopment* (or *concealment*), and of (b) *projection*.

The power of *envelopment* is such that, just as even a small cloud, by obscuring the beholder’s path of vision, seems to overspread the sun’s disc, which is many leagues in extent,—so Ignorance, though limited, veiling the understanding of the beholder, seems to cover up Self, which is unlimited, and unconnected with the universe. As it has been said,² “As he whose eye is covered by a cloud, thinks in his delusion that the sun is clouded

¹ *Māṇḍūkya*, 7.

² *Hastāmālaka*, 10.

and has lost its light,—so that Self which seems bound to him whose mind's eye is blind,—that Self, essentially eternal perception, am I.”

Self, associated with this enveloping power, appears to be an agent and a patient, and experiences the pleasure, pain, and infatuation which make up this contemptible mundane existence;¹ just as a rope, covered by ignorance as to its real nature, appears to be a snake.

The power of *projection* is such, that, just as ignorance regarding a rope, by its own power raises up the form of a snake, &c., on the rope which is covered by it,—so Ignorance too, by its projective power, raises up, on Self which is covered by it, ether and the whole universe. As it has been said,² “The projective power [of Ignorance] can create the world, beginning with subtile bodies, and ending with the terrene orb.”

Intelligence, associated with Ignorance possessed of these two powers, is, when itself is chiefly considered, the efficient cause; and when its associate

¹ The reading of the MSS. is :—*Anayaivāvaraṇasaktyāvachhinnasyātmanah kartritvabhoktrivasukhaduḥkhamohātmaikatuchhasamsārasambhāvanāpi bhavati*, which differs from all the editions.

² *Vākyasudhā*, v. 13.

is chiefly considered, is the material cause. Just as a spider, when itself is chiefly considered, is the efficient cause of its web, the effect,—and when its body is chiefly considered, is the material cause of it.

NOTES ON SECTION IV.

In the foregoing pages, two eternal entities have been described, namely, Brahma and Ignorance. These two have been united from everlasting, and the first product of their union is Îśvara or God. It should be very distinctly understood that God—"the highest of manifestations in the world of unreality"¹—is the collective aggregate of all animated things, from the highest deity down to a blade of grass, just as a forest is a collective aggregate of trees.

This, to any ordinary mind, is tantamount to saying that there is no personal God at all; for how can it be supposed that this aggregate of sentiencies has, or has ever had, any power of united action, so as to constitute it a personal Being? Yet, after describing God as identical with the aggregate of individual sentiencies, apart from which he can have no more existence than a forest can have apart from the trees which compose it, the text proceeds to treat him as a personal Being, endowed with the qualities of omniscience, &c., and bearing rule over individual souls!

The attributes assigned to him are thus explained by the commentator. His '*omniscience*' is merely his being a witness of the whole universe, animate and inanimate. He is called '*Îśvara*,' because he presides over individual souls and

¹ *Calcutta Review*, 1878, p. 314. See also *Rational Refutation*, p. 211.

allots rewards according to their works. How this aggregate of individual souls is to preside over itself, and reward each soul included in it according to its works, it is impossible to say;¹ but his functions in this capacity ought to be a sinecure, inasmuch as it is strongly insisted upon that works, whether good or bad, are followed by an exactly proportioned measure of reward or punishment, without the intervention of anybody. He is the '*controller*' in the sense of being the mover or impeller of souls; and the '*internal ruler*' as dwelling in the heart of each, and restraining the intellect. He is the '*cause of the world*,' not as its creator, but as the seat of the evolution of that illusory effect. Indeed, it would be inconsistent to speak of a creator of a world which has no greater reality than belongs to things seen in a dream!

2. The word *upādhi*, which on page 51 is rendered 'associate,' occurs very often even in Prākṛit works on philosophy, and should be fully understood. It is derived from the root *dhā*, 'to put,' in combination with the prepositions *upa* and *ā*,—and its sense, etymologically, is 'putting down near,' or 'that which is put down near.' Its philosophical meaning, as given in the *Vāchaspatyam*, is this:—'*Anyathāsthitasya vastuno 'nyathāprakāśanarūpe*'—'that which makes a thing appear different from what it is.' It is that, therefore, which, by its proximity to a thing, modifies or conditions it; as, for example, a white crystal is made to appear red when a red rose is placed behind it. The rendering 'environment,' which has lately been adopted by an Indian scholar, is not quite so easy of application to *upahita* and *anupahita*.

¹ One might as well assert the possibility of a man sitting on his own shoulders!

3. '*Īśvara's causal body.*'

As Illusion overlying Brahma is the cause of the production of all things, it is called Īśvara's causal or all-originating body. From it originate the super-sensible and sensible elements, then subtile bodies, and, lastly, gross bodies. These envelop transmigrating souls like sheaths, which have to be successively stripped off to reach pure Brahma.

4. '*Dreamless sleep.*'

There are said to be three states of the soul in respect of the body, viz., waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep. Brahma is described as 'the fourth' state. "When a man with all his wits about him is wide awake, he is regarded as being furthest removed from the state in which he ought to be,—he being then enveloped in the densest investment of Ignorance. When he falls asleep and dreams, he is considered to have shuffled off his outermost coil; and therefore a dream is spoken of as the scene of the dissolution of the totality of the gross. The objects viewed in dreams are regarded as 'subtile.' When a man sleeps so soundly that he has no dream, he is regarded as having got rid not only of his 'gross body,' but also of his 'subtile body;' hence profound and dreamless sleep is spoken of as the 'scene of the dissolution both of the gross and of the subtile body.' But although, in profound sleep, a man has got rid of all the *developments* of Ignorance, yet he is still wrapped in Ignorance itself, and this must be got rid of. He must not, like the sleeper who 'slept pleasantly and knew nothing,' 'enjoy blessedness by means of the very subtile modifications of Ignorance illuminated by Intellect,' but he must become Intellect

simply—identical with Blessedness. To this absolute Unity is given the name of ‘the Fourth.’”¹

5. As some of the readers of this book may have studied the Vedānta through the medium of Prākṛit writings, it is right to add that in those works reference is sometimes made to a sort of fifth state termed *unmanī*. The word is feminine, and is apparently derived from the adjective *unmana*, which, as defined by Molesworth, means—‘Escaped from consciousness of personality and swallowed up in the Deity or in Divine contemplation;’ and he explains *unmanī* as being ‘the fifth of the five states or modes of human existence (*jāgriti*, *svapna*, *sushupti*, *turīyā*, *unmanī*), viz., that of emancipation from the thralldom of Mâyâ, and absorption in the contemplation of Truth (the Divine essence).’ In the *pūrvārdha* of the *Vivekasindhu*—a philosophical poem written in very early times by the Marāṭhā poet Mukundarāj—the term occurs twice. In iii. 31, *Īśvara’s unmanī avasthā* is said to be the three qualities, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, in a state of equilibrium. In vi. 87–90, it is described as the fourth state arrived at maturity,—the scriptures not allowing a fifth state. The latter passage is worth quoting:—
 “*Turyechī paripakvatā | techī unmanī avasthā | nimboḷiyāns madhuratā | jaisī pakvadaśēn || 87 || Turyā te śuddhuvāsana | tethēn hāchī kaḍavatpand | unmanī bujh nirvāsana | mhaṇūni goḍa te || 88 || Jaisī sākshara ulukīn vire | parī tethīnchī madhuratā ure | taisī turyā svarūpīn mure | te unmanī gā || 89 || Avasthā panchamā nāsti | aisī he Vedaśrutē | mhaṇūni turyechī pariṇāmasthatī | te unmanī kīn || 90 ||*”

The word is found in the Calcutta dictionary *Vāchas-*

¹ Dr. Ballantyne’s *Lecture on the Vedānta*, para. 152 (f).

patyam, which defines it as ‘*Yoginām avasthābhede*.’ It is probably the same as the *unmanībhdva* explained by Śaṅkarānanda in his Commentary on *Maitrī-Upanishad*, vi. 20.

6. “*Prājña . . . enjoys bliss.*”

The two last words represent the Sanskrit *ānandabhuk*, ‘an enjoyer of bliss.’ The *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*, from which this passage is quoted, is twice reproduced in the *Nṛsiṃhatāpanī*, and in both cases it is interesting to note that the commentator Nārāyaṇa reads and explains *ajñānabhuk*, ‘enjoyer of ignorance or unconsciousness,’ instead of *ānandabhuk*. His words are as follows:—
 “*Ajñānabhuk | na kinchid aham avedisham ity utthitasy-
 ollekhāt | Māṇḍūkye tv ānandabhug iti pāṭhas tatra sukham
 aham asvāpsam ity ullekhah pramāṇam*” || *Pūrvatāpanī*,
 iv. 1.

*Ajñānabhuk | na kinchid aham avedisham ity ajñān-
 ollekhād ajñānabhuk* || *Uttaratāpanī*, i. 1.

V.

FROM Intelligence associated with Ignorance attended by its projective power, in which the quality of insensibility (*tamas*) abounds, proceeds ether,—from ether, air,—from air, heat,—from heat, water,—and from water, earth. As the Veda says,¹ “From this, from this same Self, was the ether produced.” The prevalence of insensibility in the cause of these elements is inferred from observing the excess of inanimateness which is in them.²

Then, in those elements, ether and the rest, arise the qualities pleasure, pain, and insensibility, in the proportion in which they exist in their cause. These are what are termed the subtile elements, the rudimentary elements, and the non-quintuplicated [lit. ‘not made the five,’ by combination].

From them spring the subtile bodies and the gross elements.

¹ *Taittiriya-Upanishad*, 2. 1.

² “The elements being unenlightened by Intellect, which they quite obscure.”—Ballantyne’s *Lecture on the Vedānta*. See under the word *kāra* *ṇaguṇa* in the Calcutta dictionary *Vāchaspatya*.

The '*subtile bodies*'¹ are the distinguishing [or evidentiary] bodies, consisting of seventeen members.

The '*members*' are the five organs of sense, mind, and intellect, the five organs of action, and the five vital airs.

The '*organs of sense*' are the ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose. These arise separately, in order, from the unmingled pleasure-portions of ether and the rest.²

'*Intellect*' is the modification of the internal organ which is characterised by certitude; '*mind*' is the modification characterised by resolution and irresolution; in these two are included thinking and egoism.

These arise from the *united* pleasure-endowed portions of ether and the others. That they are the effect of the pleasure-portions of the elements is inferred from their being luminous.

This intellect, together with the organs of sense, forms the cognitional sheath (*vijnānamayaakośa*)..

This one, which, through fancying itself to be

¹ This clause is omitted from five of the MSS., including those of the Commentary.

² That is to say, from ether, the characteristic of which is sound, came the ear,—from air, of which mobility is the characteristic, and in which sound and feel are sensible, came the sense of touch, and so on.

an agent and a patient, happy and unhappy, passes to and fro between this and the other world [*i.e.*, a transmigrating soul], is called the conventional¹ soul (*jīva*).

The mind, together with the organs of action, forms the mental [or sensorial] sheath (*manomayakośa*).

The ‘organs of action’ are the mouth, hand, foot, anus, and generative organ. These arise, separately, in order, from the unmixed pain-portions of the elements [which are characterised by *activity*].

The ‘vital airs’ are respiration (*prāṇa*), inspiration (*apāna*), flatuousness (*vyāna*), expiration (*udāna*), and digestion (*samāna*). ‘Respiration’ has an upward motion, and abides in the extremity of the nose; ‘inspiration’ has a downward course, and abides in the anus, &c.; ‘flatuousness’ moves in all directions, and pervades the whole body; ‘expiration’ resides in the throat, has an upward course, and is the ascending air; ‘digestion’² is

¹ “There can be no such thing as a substance existing *conventionally* but not *really*. Things there may be, existing in the opinions of men or implied in their conduct, but if we deny their reality, we can only mean that they are mere fancies, and therefore not actually existing substances. . . . In fact, conventional, as opposed to real, can only mean imaginary, in other words, false.”—*Dialogues*, p. 394.

² This is not a satisfactory rendering. Ballantyne has ‘assimilation,’ which is not much better. I adopted the names of the vital airs from Colebrooke.

that which, moving in the centre of the body, assimilates the solid and liquid food.

Some persons [followers of Kapila] say that there are five other airs, named *Nâga*, *Kûrma*, *Kṛikala*, *Devadatta*, and *Dhananjaya*.

'*Nâga*' is that which causes eructation ; '*kûrma*' is that which causes the opening of the eyes ; '*kṛikala*' causes hunger, and '*devadatta*' yawning ; and '*dhananjaya*'¹ is the nourisher.

But others [the Vedântins] say that there are five only, as these are included amongst respiration and the rest.

This set of five vital airs arises from the united pain-portions of the elements, ether and the others. The five, together with the organs of action, form the respiratory sheath (*prâṇamaya-kośa*). Its being a product of the pain-portions of the elements is inferred from its being endowed with activity [the characteristic of the '*rajoguna*'].

Of these sheaths, 'the intellectual,' being endowed with the faculty of knowing, is an agent ; the 'mental,' having the faculty of desire, is an instrument ; and the 'respiratory,' having the

¹ This air continues in the body even after death, says the scholiast, quoting from the *Gorakshaśataka* : "*na jahāti mṛtañchâpi sarvavyâpi dhananjayaḥ* !"

faculty of activity, is an effect. This division is in accord with the capabilities of each. These three sheaths together constitute the subtile frame.¹

Here, too, the totality of the subtile bodies, as the object of one cognition [*i.e.*, Sûtrâtmâ's], is a collective aggregate like the forest or the lake; or, as the object of many cognitions [*viz.*, those of individual souls], is a distributive aggregate, like the forest-trees or the lake-waters.

Intelligence associated with the collective aggregate [of subtile bodies] is called Sûtrâtmâ [Thread-soul], Hiranyagarbha and Prâṇa, because it passes as a thread through all the [subtile frames], and because it is associated with the three sheaths possessing the faculties of knowing, desire, and activity.

This collective aggregate, because it is more subtile than the gross organisms, is called His subtile body, consisting of the three sheaths, 'the intellectual' and the others; and because it consists of the [continuance of the] waking thoughts, it is called a dream, and is therefore said to be the scene of the dissolution of the gross.²

¹ It attends the soul in its transmigrations

² "For, in a dream, the sight of trees and rivers, and the sound of voices, &c., are present to us, without the actual things called trees, &c.

Intelligence associated with the distributive aggregate of subtile organisms is *Taijasa* (the brilliant), because it has the luminous internal organ as its associate.

This distributive aggregate, too, being more subtile than the gross organisms, is called his subtile frame, comprising the three sheaths beginning with 'the intellectual;' and it is said to be a dream because it is made up of the [continuance of the] waking thoughts, on which account it is called the scene of the dissolution of the gross organisms.

These two, *Sûtrâtmâ* and *Taijasa*, by means of the modifications of the mind, have experience of subtile objects. As it is said in the *Veda*,¹ "*Taijasa* has fruition of the supersensible."

There is no difference between the collective and distributive aggregates of the subtile frames or between *Sûtrâtmâ* and *Taijasa*, who are associated with them,—just as there is none between the forest and its trees, or between the space occupied by each,—or between the lake and its waters, and the sky reflected in each.

being present at all. To the dreamer, the whole external world is as it were not,—and, in the opinion of the Vedântin, to the dreamer it really is not."—*Lecture on the Vedânta*.

¹ *Māṇḍūkya*, 4.

Thus were the subtile organisms produced.

The gross elements are those that have been made by combining the five [subtile elements]. Quintuplication is on this wise. After dividing each of the five subtile elements, ether and the rest, into two equal parts, and then subdividing each of the first five of the ten moieties into four equal parts, mix those four parts with the others, leaving the [undivided] second moiety of each. As it has been said,¹ "After dividing each into two parts, and the first halves again into four parts, by uniting the latter to the second half of each, each contains the five."²

It must not be supposed that there is no authority for this, for from the Vedic passage regarding the combination of three things,³ the combination of five is implied. Though the five alike contain the five, the name 'ether' and the rest are still applicable⁴ to them, in accordance with the saying,⁵

¹ *Panchadaśī*, i. 27.

² That is, "the particles of the several elements, being divisible, are, in the first place, split into moieties; whereof one is subdivided into quarters, and the remaining moiety combines with one part (a quarter of a moiety) from each of the four others."—Colebrooke's *Essays*, i. 396. Each of the five elements thus contains a moiety of itself and an eighth of each of the others.

³ *Chhândogya Upanishad*, 6. 3. 3.

⁴ The name 'ether' is suitable to the first because 'ether' largely predominates in it, and so with the other four.

⁵ *Vedānta-sūtras*, 2. 4. 22. This was wrongly rendered in the first

“ Their appellation is on account of the preponderance ¹ [of that element after which each is named].” Then in ether sound is manifested,—in air, sound and touch,—in heat, sound, touch, and form,—in water, sound, touch, form, and taste,—in earth, sound, touch, form, taste, and smell.

From these quintuplicated elements spring, one above the other, the worlds Bhûr, Bhuvar, Svar, Mahar, Janas, Tapas, and Satya; and, one below the other, the nether worlds called Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasâtala, Talâtala, Mahâtala, and Pâtâla; ²—Brahmâ’s egg;—the four kinds of gross bodies; and food and drink suitable for them.

‘ *The four kinds of bodies* ’ are the viviparous, the oviparous, the moisture-engendered (*svedaja*), and the germinating.

The viviparous are those produced from the womb, as men and animals; *the oviparous* are

edition of this work. Ballantyne’s rendering is—“ But, as they differ, &c.” The above, however, seems to me to be most in accord with Śankara’s interpretation. The word *tadvādaḥ* is repeated in order to indicate the conclusion of the chapter, and not as a part of the Sūtra. Śankara’s explanation is as follows :—“ *Viśeshabhāvo vaiśeṣyam bhūyastvam iti yāvāt | Satyapi trivṛttikarṇe kvachit kasyachid bhūtatadhātor bhūyastvam upalakshyate ‘agnes tejobhūyastvam udakasyādbhūyastvam prithivyā annabhūyastvam’ iti | . . . Tadvādas tadvāda iti padābhidyāso ‘dhyāyaparisaṃāptim dyotayati ||* ”

¹ All my MSS. read *vaiśeṣhyāt*, not *vaiśiṣṭhyāt*.

² For an account of these upper and lower regions, see Wilson’s *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, ii. 209, 225.

those born from eggs, as birds and snakes; *the moisture-engendered* are those which spring from moisture, as lice and gnats; *the germinating* are those which shoot up from the ground, as grass and trees.

In this case, too, the fourfold gross body, according as it is an object of cognition as one or as many, is a collective aggregate like a forest or a lake, or a distributive aggregate like the forest-trees or the lake-waters.

Intelligence associated with this collective aggregate is called Vaiśvânara [the spirit of humanity] or Viât;¹ [the former] because of the conceit that it is in the whole of humanity, and [the latter] because it appears in various forms.²

This collective aggregate is his gross body. It is called the nutrimentitious sheath (*annamayakośa*), on account of the changes of food [which go on within it and build it up], and the gross body and the waking-state, because it is the scene of the fruition of the gross.

Intelligence associated with the distributive

¹ Compare *Manu*, i. 32, 33, and *Sanskrit Texts*, v. 369.

² I have followed the scholiast, who says, *Sarva-prāṇinikāyeshvāham ityabhimānatvād vaiśvānaratvam; nānāprakāreṇa prakāśamānatvāch chavairdījatvam labhata ityārthaḥ*. Ballantyne's rendering of the last clause is, "Because it rules over the various kinds [of bodies]."

aggregate is called Viśva, because, without abandoning the conceit of the subtile body, it enters into the gross bodies.

This distributive aggregate is his gross body, and is called the nutrimentitious sheath on account of the changes of food [which go on within it and build it up]. It is also said to be awake because it is the seat of the fruition of the gross.

Viśva and Vaiśvânara have experience of all gross objects; that is, by means of the ear and the rest of the five organs of sense, which are controlled by the quarters, wind, the sun, Varuṇa, and the Aśvins respectively, [they have experience of] sound, sensation, form, taste, and smell;—by means of the mouth and the rest of the five organs of action, which are controlled by Agni, Indra, Upendra, Yama, and Prajâpati respectively, [they have experience of] speaking, taking, walking, evacuation, and sensual delights; and by means of the four internal organs named mind, intellect, egoism, and thinking, which are controlled by the moon, Brahmâ, Śiva, and Viṣṇu respectively, [they have experience of] resolution, certitude, egoising, and thinking. As it is said in the Veda,¹ [“The first

¹ *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*, 3.

quarter is Vaśvânara], who is in the waking state, and has cognition of externals.”

Here, too, as in the former cases, there is no difference between the distributive and collective aggregates of gross organisms, or between Viśva and Vaiśvânara who are associated with them; just as there is none between a forest and its trees, or between the spaces occupied by them,—or between a lake and its waters, or between the sky reflected in them.

In this way is the gross produced from the five elements quintuplicated.

NOTES ON SECTION V

1. Recapitulating, then, Brahma is illusorily associated with three kinds of bodies :—

Firstly, with a causal body, composed of Ignorance or Illusion, which, in the aggregate, is *Îsvara* or God, and, distributively, individual souls or *Prâjna*. It is likened to a state of dreamless sleep.

Secondly, with a subtile body composed of the five organs of sense and of action, mind, intellect, and the five vital airs, seventeen in all. This, in the aggregate, is called *Hiraṇyagarbha*, or the Thread-soul, and, in the distributed state, *Taijasa*. It is likened to a state of dream.

Thirdly, with a gross body composed of the compounded elements. Viewed in the aggregate, it is called *Vaiśvânara*, and, distributively, *Viśva*. It is likened to the waking-state.

A fourth state is that of the unassociated pure Brahma, which is technically styled 'The Fourth.'

2. Mind, intellect, egoism, and thinking, which, on page 72, are styled 'internal organs,' are, collectively, 'the internal organ.' See note on page 5; and also the first chapter of *Vedântaparibhâṣhâ* where it is said—*Evam vṛittibhedenaikam apy antaḥkaraṇam manā iti buddhir ity ahaṁkāra iti chittum iti chākhyāyate*. The *Paṇḍit*, vol. iv. p. 395.

VI.

THE collective aggregate of all these expanses of gross, subtile, and causal bodies is one vast expanse ; just as the aggregate of a number of minor [or included] forests is one large forest, or that of a number of minor [or included] bodies of water is one large body.

Intelligence associated with it, from Vaiśvânara up to Īśvara, is one only ; just as the space occupied by the various included forests is one, or as the sky reflected in the various included bodies of water is one.

Unassociated Intelligence not seen to be distinct from the great expanse and the Intelligence associated with it, like a heated ball of iron, [in which the iron and the fire are not discriminated,] is the literal [or primary] meaning of the sentence, "Truly all this is Brahma ;" but when seen as distinct, it is what is indicated by that sentence.

Thus 'illusory attribution,' or the superimposing of the unreal upon the Real, has been set forth in

general terms. But now, the particular way in which one man imposes this and another that upon the all-pervading [individuated] Self is to be declared.

For example, the very illiterate man says that his son is his Self; on account of the text of the Veda,¹ "Self is born as a son;" and because he sees that he has the same love for his son as for himself; and because he finds that if it is well or ill with his son, it is well or ill with himself.

A Chârvâka says that the gross body is his Self; on account of the text of the Veda,² "This is man as made up of the extract of food;" and because he sees that a man leaving his son [to burn], departs himself from a burning house; and because of the experience, "*I am fat*," "*I am lean*."

Another Chârvâka says that the organs of sense are his Self; on account of the text of the Veda,³ "They, the organs of sense (*prâṇâḥ*), went to Prajâpati and said, ['Lord, which of us is the chief?'] He said unto them, 'He is chief among you whose departure makes the body seem worthless';" and because in the absence of the organs of sense the functions of the body cease; and because

¹ Cf. *Satapatha Brâh.*, 14. 9. 4. 26.

² *Tait. Upanishad*, 2. 1.

³ *Chhândogya*, 5. 1. 7.

of the experience, "*I am blind of one eye,*" "*I am deaf.*"

Another Chârvâka says that the vital airs are his Self; on account of the text of the Veda,¹ "There is another, an inner Self, made of the vital airs;" and because in the absence of the vital airs the organs of sense are inactive; and because of the experience, "*I am hungry,*" "*I am thirsty.*"

Another Chârvâka says that the mind is his Self; on account of the text of the Veda,² "There is another, an inner Self, made of the mind;" and because when the mind sleeps the vital airs cease to be; and because of the experience, "*I resolve,*" "*I doubt.*"

A Bauddha says that intellect is his Self; on account of the text of the Veda,³ "There is another, an inner Self, made up of cognition;" and because, in the absence of an agent, an instrument is powerless; and because of the experience, "*I am an agent,*" "*I am a patient.*"

The Prâbhākara and the Târkika say that ignorance is their Self; on account of the text of the Veda,⁴ "There is another, an inner Self, made up of bliss;" and because intellect and the rest are

¹ *Tait. Upanishad*, 2. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, 2. 4.

² *Ibid.*, 2. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2. 5.

merged in ignorance; and because of the experience, “*I am ignorant.*”

The Bhâtta says that Intelligence associated with ignorance is his Self; on account of the text of the Veda,¹ “Self is a mass of knowledge, and comprised of bliss;” and because during sound sleep there are both the light [of intelligence] and the darkness [of ignorance²]; and because of the experience, “Myself I know not.”

Another Bauddha says that nihility is his Self; on account of the text of the Veda,³ “In the beginning, this was the non-existent;” and because during sound sleep everything disappears; and because of the experience of the man who has just awoke from sleep,—an experience in the shape of a reflection on his own non-existence,—when he says, “During sound sleep, *I was not.*”

That these, beginning with ‘son,’ have not the nature of Self, is now declared. Seeing that, in the fallacies based on Vedic texts, arguments, and personal experience, brought forward by the ‘very

¹ *Māṇḍūkya*, 5.

² “For, as the commentator says, referring to the sentence ‘I slept pleasantly—I was aware of nothing,’ if there were not light or knowledge in the soul, how could the sleeper have known that his sleep was pleasant? And if there were not the absence of light or knowledge, how could he say, ‘I was aware of nothing?’”—Ballantyne’s *Lecture on the Vedānta*.

³ *Chhândogya*, 6. 2. 1.

illiterate man' and the other speakers, each succeeding fallacy refutes the notion of Self put forth in that preceding it, it is clear that 'son' and the rest are not the Self.

Moreover, from the opposite statements of other weighty Vedic texts to the effect that the all-pervading [individuated] Self is not gross, not the eye, not the vital airs, not the mind, not an agent, but intelligence, mere intelligence, and existent,—from the transitory character, as of a jar, of the insentient objects beginning with 'son' and ending with 'nihility,' which owe their visibility to Intelligence,—from the force of the experience of the wise, viz., 'I am Brahma,'—and also from the fact that the fallacies based on this and that Vedic passage, argument, and personal experience have been refuted,—each of those from 'son' down to 'nihility' is assuredly not the Self.

Therefore, all-pervading [individuated] Intelligence alone, the illuminator of each of those [son and the rest], whose essence is eternal, pure, intelligent (*buddha*), free and true, is the true Self—such is the experience of those who know the Vedânta.

NOTES ON SECTION VI.

1. The *Chârvâkas*, otherwise called *Śūnyavâdins* or *Lokâyatikas*, were one of the ancient heretical sects of Hindus. Professor Wilson says of them (*Works*, ii. 87) that they “condemned all ceremonial rites, ridiculed even the Śrâddha, and called the authors of the Vedas fools, knaves, and buffoons.” He says too that they were “named from one of their teachers, the Muni Chârvâka. . . . The appellation Śūnyavâdî implies the asserter of the unreality and emptiness of the universe; and another designation, Lokâyata, expresses their adoption of the tenet, that this being is the *Be-all* of existence; they were, in short, the advocates of materialism and atheism” (*Works*, i. 22). Colebrooke, too, calls their doctrine “undisguised materialism.” According to this scholar, their principal tenets were, (a) the identity of the soul with the body,—(b) the rejection of *ākāśa* as an element,—and (c) the acknowledgment of perception alone as a means of proof. Their doctrines are explained in the first chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, which has been translated by Professor Cowell.¹ They are referred to in *Panchadaśī* vi. 216 also.

2. The *Bauddhas*, or followers of Buddha, are said by Brahmanical controversialists to have been divided into

¹ Vide the above work in Trubner's *Oriental Series*.—The term *Lokâyata*, or *Lokâyatika*, is here explained to be that applied to men who held the opinion, ‘widely prevalent in the world’ (*lokeshu âyatam vistṛṇam*), that wealth and desire are the only ends of man, and that there is no future world.

four sects, styled *Mādhyamikas*, *Yogāchāras*, *Sautrāntikas*, and *Vaibhāshikas*. Those referred to in the text would be the first two, the former of whom are said to have maintained that all is void, and the latter that all is void but intelligence. Possibly these four schools did at one time exist amongst the Indian Buddhists; but it is difficult to understand how they could have held the views ascribed to them in the text. For one of the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism is that *there is no self*. One of the best authorities on Southern Buddhist teaching thus wrote:—"The idea of the Brahmans is, that there is a supreme existence, *paramātmā*, from which each individual existence has derived its being, but that this separate existence is an illusion; and that the grand object of man is to effect the destruction of the cause of seeming separation, and to secure the reunion of the derived and the underived, the conditioned and the unconditioned. But Buddha repeatedly, by an exhaustive variation of argument, denies that there is any self or ego. Again and again, he runs over the components and essentialities of being, enumerating with tedious minuteness the classifications into which they may be divided, in order to convince his followers that, in whatever way these constituents may be placed, or however they may be arranged, there can be found in them no self."¹ How then could the Buddhists referred to in the text have held 'nihility' or 'intelligence' to be *Self*?

3. The *Prābhākara*s were the followers of Prabhākara, the well-known scholiast of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*; the

¹ Hardy's *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, p. 171. See also this author's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 405; and Rhys Davids' *Buddhism*, pp. 90-99.

Tārkikas are of course the Naiyâyikas or followers of the Nyâya. The *Bhāṭṭas* are presumably the disciples of Kumârila Bhaṭṭa, the well-known Mîmâṃsaka already referred to, who lived about a century before Śankara Âchârya.

4. This section brings to an end the first division of the treatise, which is occupied with the consideration of the *adhyârôpa* (p. 42).

VII.

THE 'withdrawal' (*apavāda*) is the assertion that the whole of the unreal, beginning with Ignorance, which is an illusory effect of the Real, is nothing but the Real; just as a snake, which is the illusory effect of a rope, is nothing whatsoever but the rope.

It has been said,¹ "An actual change of form is called *vikāra*, whilst a merely apparent change of form is called *vivartta*." This shall now be illustrated.

The whole of the four classes of gross bodies constituting the seat of enjoyment,—the food and drink necessary for their use,—the fourteen worlds, Bhûr and the rest, the repository of these,—and Brahmâ's egg which is the receptacle of all those worlds,—all these are nothing more than the quintuplicated elements of which they are made.

The quintuplicated elements, with sound and the other objects of sense, and the subtile bodies,—all

¹ I am unable to trace this quotation to its source. Some MSS. of the *Vedāntasāra* omit it.

these are nothing more than the non-quintuplicated elements of which they are made.

The non-quintuplicated elements, with the qualities of goodness and the rest, in the inverse order of their production, are nothing more than Ignorance-associated Intelligence, which is their material cause.

Ignorance,¹ and Intelligence associated with it, constituting Íśvara, &c., are nothing more than Brahma, the Fourth, the unassociated Intelligence, which forms their substrate.

¹ How can *Ignorance* be "nothing more than Brahma," seeing that it is an eternally distinct "entity" (*bhāvarūpa*)? The schoolmen, of course, repudiate it as a *real* entity; but even they recognise it as an eternal 'something,' distinct from Brahma. See p. 44.

NOTE ON SECTION VII.

The object of the foregoing is to demonstrate that the phenomenal world is nought but the illusory effect (*vivartta*) of the secondless Reality Brahma, who is its illusory material cause. The relation between Brahma and the phenomenal is that of the rope mistaken for a snake, which snake is only an illusion. *Vikāra*, on the other hand, which is synonymous with *pariṇāma* (*Amara*, iii. 2. 15), is a real change of form and name. Instances of it are found in the formation of an earring from a lump of gold, or of a jar or toy-elephant from clay, in which there is a change of form and of name, but not of substance; or in the transformation of milk into curds, where there is a change of substance as well as of name and form.

The old Vedântists, as already stated, regarded the phenomenal world as a *vikāra* or evolution from Brahma, a view which is strenuously rejected by the moderns¹ or *māyāvādins*.

¹ Their doctrine of existences, described above, must be borne in mind here.

VIII.

By means of these two, illusory attribution and its withdrawal, the precise meaning of the words 'That' and 'Thou' [in the sentence 'That art Thou,' '*tat tvam asi*'] is determined.

For example, the collective aggregate of Ignorance and the rest, Intelligence associated with it and having the characteristic of omniscience, &c. [*i.e.*, *Īśvara*], and the unassociated Intelligence,—this triad, appearing as one, after the manner of a red-hot iron ball [where the iron and the fire are not viewed as distinct], is the literal [or expressed] meaning of the word 'That,' but, unassociated Intelligence, the substrate of that which is associated, is the indicated meaning.

The distributive aggregate of Ignorance and the rest, Intelligence associated with it and having the characteristic of limited knowledge [*i.e.*, *Prājña*], and Intelligence which is not associated,—this triad, appearing as one, after the manner of a red-

hot ball of iron, is the literal meaning of the word 'Thou ;' but, pure Intelligence, the Fourth, all-pervading joy, the substrate of that associated Intelligence, is the meaning which is indicated.

NOTE ON SECTION VIII.

This section prepares the way for the subject to the consideration of which the two succeeding sections are devoted, namely, the identity in meaning of the terms 'That' and 'Thou' in the great Vedântic sentence 'That art Thou.'

"If they cannot be shown to mean the same thing, then the sentence does not enunciate a truth. The author therefore undertakes to show that they do mean the same thing. This he does by showing, as we have just seen, that the only apparent difference between the senses of the two terms is that which appears to exist between Ignorance in its *collective* aggregate and Ignorance in its *distributive* aggregate; and as it has been ruled that these have *no* difference—as there is none between a forest and its trees—it follows that there is no difference in meaning between the term 'That' and the term 'Thou' in the sentence 'That art Thou.'"¹

¹ Ballantyne's *Lecture on the Vedânta*.

IX.

Now the great sentence shall be explained.

This sentence, 'That art Thou,' viewed under three different relations, declares what is meant by the Impartite (page 1).

The three relations are—

- (a.) The community of reference (*sāmānādhikaranyā*) of the two words ['That' and 'Thou'].
- (b.) The position of predicate and subject (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣhyabhāva*) occupied by the things referred to by the words,—and
- (c.) The connection as indicated and indicator (*lakshyalakṣaṇabhāva*), between the purport of the two words and individuated self.¹

As it has been said, "Between the things

¹ This is the reading of the editions,—but eight out of nine MSS. which I have consulted read *pratyagātmalakṣaṇayoh*. The only one that supported the reading of the editions has been marginally altered, and now agrees with the rest !

which the words refer to, and individuated self (*pratyagātman*), there is community of reference, the connection as predicate and subject, and as indicated and indicator.”¹

(a.) *Community of reference.*

As, in the sentence ‘That is this same Devadatta,’² the words ‘that’ and ‘this,’ which respectively distinguish the Devadatta of a former and of the present time, are connected by the fact that they both refer to one and the same Devadatta;—so, too, in the sentence ‘That art Thou,’ the words ‘That’ and ‘Thou,’ which indicate Intelligence characterised respectively by invisibility and visibility, have the connection of reference to one and the same Intelligence.

(b.) *Connection as predicate and subject.*

As, in that same sentence [‘That is this same D.'], the relation of predicate and subject exists between the Devadatta of the former time, who is referred to in the word ‘That,’ and the Devadatta of the present time, referred to in the word ‘this,’—a relation constituted by the exclusion of the difference [of time] which there is between

¹ *Naishkarmyasiddhi*, iii. 3; also in *Bṛihadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārtika*, v. 5.

² *I.e.*, ‘That person whom I saw on some former occasion is this same Devadatta whom I now behold.’—Ballantyne’s *Lecture on the Vedānta*.

them,—so, too, in this sentence [‘That art Thou’] is there the relation of predicate and subject between Intelligence distinguished by invisibility, as indicated by the word ‘That,’ and Intelligence distinguished by visibility, as indicated by the word ‘Thou,’—a relation constituted by the exclusion of the difference which there is between them.

(c.) *Connection as indicator and indicated.*

As in that sentence [‘That is this D.'], by the omission of the contradictory characteristics of former and present time, the words ‘that’ and ‘this,’ or the things they refer to, hold the relation of indicator and indicated with respect to the non-contradictory [or common] term ‘Devadatta;’—so, too, in this sentence [‘That art Thou’], by the omission of the conflicting characteristics of invisibility and visibility, the words ‘That’ and ‘Thou,’ or the things represented by them, hold the relation of indicator and indicated with respect to the non-conflicting [or common] term ‘Intelligence.’

This is what is called [in Alaṅkāra] ‘the indication of a portion’¹ (*bhāgalakṣaṇā*).

¹ Cf. *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa-Uttarakāṇḍa*, v. 27.

NOTE ON SECTION IX.

Bhāgalakṣhaṇā.

According to Hindu rhetoricians, the meaning of every word or sentence comes under one of three heads, that is, it is either literal (*vāchya*), indicative (*lakshya*), or suggestive (*vyangya*). Their three functions or powers are termed Denotation (*abhidhā*), Indication (*lakṣhaṇā*), and Suggestion (*vyañjanā*). We are here concerned with the middle one only, which is thus defined in the *Kāvya-prakāśa* (ii. 9): "When the literal meaning is incompatible [with the rest of the sentence], and, either from usage or from some motive, another meaning is indicated, in connection with the primary one, that imposed function is called 'Indication.'"

The sentence "A herd-station on the Ganges" is an example of this. Here the *literal* meaning of the word 'Ganges' is *incompatible* with the rest of the sentence, it being impossible that the herdsmen could be living on the surface of the water; so it is clear that the river's 'bank' is *indicated*, and this meaning is *imposed* upon the word 'Ganges' in accordance with *usage*. In using the word 'Ganges' rather than 'bank of the Ganges,' there is also the *motive* of conveying the idea of coolness, purity, &c., which might not be equally well suggested by the use of the latter expression.

There are numerous varieties of 'Indication'—according to the author of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, there are as many as eighty—but the two principal ones, and those which alone concern us, are—

- (1.) Inclusive Indication (*upādāna-lakṣhaṇā*), and
- (2.) Indicative Indication (*lakṣhaṇa-lakṣhaṇā*).

The former is described in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* (ii. 10) as that which introduces something else in order to establish itself, and the latter as that which abandons itself in order to introduce something else.

An example of 'Inclusive Indication' is "The white is galloping," the literal sense of which is impossible, whilst what is indicated is "The white *horse* is galloping." Thus the word 'horse' is introduced without the abandonment of the term 'white.' This class is therefore sometimes called '*ajahatsvārthā*' or '*ajahallakṣhaṇā*,' Indication in which there is the use of a word *without* the abandonment of its sense.

An example of 'Indicative Indication,' or Indication simply, is the sentence already given, "A herd-station on the Ganges," where the word 'Ganges' abandons its own meaning in order to introduce that of the 'bank.' This class is therefore sometimes called '*jahatsvārthā*,' or '*jahallakṣhaṇā*,' Indication in which there is the use of a word *with* the abandonment of its meaning.

Now the *bhāgalakṣhaṇā* of the text is a combination of these two varieties, and is therefore otherwise called *jahadaajahallakṣhaṇā*. This term is defined in the *Vāchaspatya* as "Indication abiding in one part of the expressed meaning, whilst another part of it is abandoned. As, for example, in the sentence 'That is this Devadatta,' whilst the meanings expressive of past and present time are abandoned, another portion of the expressed meaning remains and conveys the idea of the one Devadatta. And again, in the sentence 'That art thou, Śvetaketu,' whilst there is the abandonment of

the conflicting ideas of omniscience and parviscience, there is, as in the other example, the retention of one portion which conveys the idea of Intelligence only.”¹

These two varieties of Indication must be thoroughly understood in order to comprehend the purport of the following section.

¹ Vide *Vāchaspatya*, s.v. *Jahadajahallakshana*.

X.

IN the sentence 'That art Thou,' the *literal* meaning is not suitable as it is in such a sentence as 'The lotus is blue.' For, in the latter, the literal sense suits because there is no valid reason for not accepting the fact that the quality denoted by the term 'blue,' and the substance denoted by the term 'lotus,'—inasmuch as they exclude such other qualities and substances as 'whiteness' and 'cloth,'—are mutually connected as subject and predicate, or are identical, each being qualified by the other.¹

But, in the former sentence, the literal meaning does not suit, because there is the evidence of our senses against the acceptance of a connection as subject and predicate, between Intelligence distinguished by invisibility as denoted by the term 'That,' and Intelligence distinguished by visibility as denoted by the term 'Thou,'—a connection con-

¹ The 'lotus' being the thing that we call 'blue,' and the 'blue' thing being what we call 'lotus.'—*Ballantyne*.

stituted by the exclusion of their mutual differences (page 91);—and also against our regarding them as identical, each being qualified by the other.¹

Nor, again, is it consistent to regard it as an example of ‘Indication in which the primary sense is abandoned’² (*jahallakṣhaṇā*), as is the case in the sentence ‘The herdsman lives on the Ganges.’ For, as the literal sense, which places the Ganges and the herdsman in the relation of location and thing located, is altogether incongruous, whilst an appropriate sense is obtained by abandoning the literal meaning altogether and regarding it as indicating the ‘bank’ connected with it,—it is rightly regarded as an example of ‘Indication in which the primary sense is abandoned.’

But, in the other case, as the literal sense, which expresses the identity of the Intelligences characterised severally by invisibility and visibility, is only partially incongruous,—and as it would be inappropriate to abandon the remaining part also³ and

¹ One MS. of the text introduces here *Panchadaśī*, vii. 75—‘*Samsargo vā viśiṣṭo vā*, &c.,’ preceded, as usual, by the words *Tad uktam*. Three MSS. of the Commentary also give it—but whether as text or comment it is hard to say.

² *Vide* Note on preceding section.

³ The reading of almost all the MSS. is *bhāgāntaram api parityajya*—and Ballantyne (p. 58) gives the rendering of these words, though his text, like that of the other editions, has *bhāgāntaram aparityajya*.

consider something else to be indicated,—it is not proper to regard it as an instance of ‘Indication in which the primary sense is abandoned.’

And it must not be said, “As the word ‘Ganges’ abandons its own meaning and indicates the word ‘bank,’ so let the word ‘That’ or ‘Thou’ abandon its own meaning and indicate the word ‘Thou’ or ‘That,’ and then *jahallakṣhaṇā* would not be incongruous.” For, in the one case, as there is no distinct notion of the word ‘bank,’ because it is not heard, there is expectation of the conveyance of that notion by Indication; but as the words ‘That’ and ‘Thou’ are heard, and there is a distinct perception of their sense, there is no expectation of the reconveyance of the perception of the sense of each by the other, by means of Indication.

Further, it cannot be regarded as an instance of ‘*ajahallakṣhaṇā*,’ as is the case in the sentence “The red is running.”¹ For, as the literal sense, which denotes the motion of the quality ‘red,’ is incongruous, whilst it is possible to avoid that incongruity by perceiving that a ‘horse,’ or other animal, is indicated as the seat of the

¹ *Vide* Note on preceding section.

redness, without the abandonment of the term 'red,'—it is right to regard it as an instance of 'Indication in which the primary sense is not abandoned' (*ajahallakṣhaṇā*).

But, in the other case, as the literal sense, namely, the identity of the Intelligences distinguished severally by invisibility and visibility, is incongruous, and it is *not* possible to remove the incongruity,¹ even by regarding something else connected therewith as indicated without the abandonment of the contradictory terms, the sentence does not stand as an example of that kind of Indication.

And it must not be said, "Let the word 'That' or 'Thou' abandon the incongruous portion of its meaning,² and, retaining the other portion,³ indicate the meaning of the word 'Thou' or 'That' ⁴ respectively; then there will be no need of explaining it in another way as '*bhāgalakṣhaṇā*' or the 'Indication of a portion.'" For it is impossible for one word to indicate a *portion* of its own

¹ The reading of the MSS.—*tadvirodhaparihārāsambhavāt*—is better than the *tadvirodhāparihārāt* of the editions.

² Viz., that of invisibility or visibility, respectively.

³ Viz., that of Intelligence.

⁴ *I.e.*, Intelligence characterised by parviscience, &c., or by omniscience, &c., respectively.

meaning and the meaning of another word ; and, further, there is no expectation of a further perception of the meaning by means of Indication, when it has been already perceived by the use of a separate word.

Therefore, as, on account of the incongruity of a portion of its literal meaning which denotes a Devadatta of both past and present time, the sentence ‘That is this Devadatta,’ or its purport, by abandoning the portion characterised by the contradictory terms, past and present time, indicates merely the non-contradictory portion, namely, Devadatta himself,—so, in like manner, on account of the incongruity of a portion of its literal sense, which denotes the identity of Intelligences characterised by invisibility and visibility, the sentence ‘That art Thou,’ or its purport, abandons the portion characterised by the conflicting terms invisibility and visibility, and indicates merely the non-conflicting portion, namely, Impartite Intelligence.

NOTE ON SECTION X.

“This view of the matter may be illustrated algebraically. Not being able to admit as an equation the expression ‘Devadatta + past time = Devadatta + present time,’ we reflect that the conception of *time* is not essential to the conception of D’s nature; and we strike it out of both sides of the expression, which then gives ‘Devadatta = Devadatta,’ the equality being that of identity. In the same way, not being able to admit as an equation the expression ‘Soul + invisibility = Soul + visibility,’ we reflect that the visibility, &c., are but the modifications of Ignorance, which, we were told, is no ‘reality.’ Deleting the unessential portion of each side of the expression, we find ‘Soul = Soul,’ the equality being here also that of identity.”¹

It must be understood that this Section is closely connected with the Ninth, and must be read with it. The two are here disconnected in order to introduce the explanation of a technicality.

¹ Ballantyne’s *Lecture on the Vedānta*.

XI.

THE meaning of the sentence "I am Brahma," [the expression of] the experience [of the instructed pupil] shall now be explained.

When, after thus making clear the meaning of the words 'That' and 'Thou' by means of the erroneous attribution and its subsequent withdrawal, the teacher has communicated the meaning of the Impartite by means of the sentence ['That art Thou'], then a modification of the internal organ (*chittavṛitti*) assuming the form of the Impartite, arises within the qualified person, and he says, "I am Brahma, the unchanging, pure, intelligent, free, undecaying, supreme joy, eternal, secondless."

That modification of the internal organ, being accompanied by the reflection of Intelligence, and being directed towards the previously unrecognised Supreme Brahma, non-different from individuated Self, drives away the ignorance which invests It.

Then, as, when the threads composing a piece of cloth are burned, the cloth itself is consumed, so, when Ignorance, the cause of all, is destroyed, every effect ceases ; and therefore the modification of the internal organ which has assumed the form of the Impartite, being one of those effects, also ceases.

As the light of a lamp, unable to illuminate the sun's light, is overpowered by it, so, too, the Intelligence which is there reflected,¹ being incapable of illuminating the Supreme Brahma, non-different from individuated Self, is overpowered by it ; and its associate, the modification of the internal organ [shaped] on the Impartite, having been destroyed, it becomes [*i.e.*, merges into] the Supreme Brahma, non-different from individuated Self ; just as, on the removal of a mirror, the face reflected in it lapses into the face itself.

Such being the case, the two Vedic sayings, "It [Brahma] is to be perceived by the mind alone,"² and "That [Brahma] which with the mind one thinks not,"³ are not contradictory. For whilst the need of the pervasion by the modification of the internal organ is admitted, [for the cognition

¹ The word *vṛttau* is not in any of the MSS., or in Böhlingk's edition.

² *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, 4. 4. 19.

³ *Kenopanishad*, i. 5.

of the veiled Brahma, as of other unknown objects,] the need of its pervading the result [viz., the unveiled Brahma] is denied. As it has been said,¹ “The authors of the Śâstras deny that [in Its case] there is need of its pervading the result.” “For the removal of the ignorance [resting] on Brahma, its pervasion by the modification of the internal organ is requisite; but as Brahma is self-luminous, the light [necessary for illuminating the jar, &c.] is of no use [in Its case].”²

When the modification of the internal organ assumes the shape of an *inanimate* object, the case is different. For example, [in the cognition] ‘This is a jar,’ the modification of the internal organ which assumes the shape of the jar, being directed towards the unknown object, jar, first removes the ignorance resting on it, and then illuminates it, being insentient,³ with the light of its own indwelling Intelligence. As it has been said,⁴ “The internal organ and the light of Intelligence abiding in it, both pervade the jar; the ignorance resting there disappears by means of the former,

¹ *Panchadaś*, vii. 89.

² *Ibid.*, vii. 91.

³ Here too the editions have a wrong reading, viz., *jaḍam api ghaṭam*. In the MSS. the word *api* comes last.

⁴ *Panchadaś*, vii. 90.

whilst the jar bursts forth by means of the latter." Just as the light of a lamp directed towards a jar, a piece of cloth, or other object standing in the dark, dispels the darkness enveloping it, and by its own brilliance brings it to view.

NOTE ON SECTION XI.

From this passage we learn that when the meaning of the great sentence 'That art Thou' has been explained to the pupil and understood by him, he perceives the Impartite and realises his oneness with It.

According to the Vedânta, perception of an object, such as a jar, takes place in the following way. When the eye is fixed upon the jar, the internal organ, with the Intelligence appropriated to or reflected in it, goes out towards it, and by its light dispels the darkness of Ignorance enveloping it, illuminates it, *assumes its shape*, and so cognises it. The stock illustration of this is that of water flowing from a well or tank by means of a narrow open channel, emptying itself into the square beds with raised edges, into which a field is sometimes divided for the purpose of irrigation, and assuming the shape of those beds. The illuminated internal organ is the water, and the operation is called an evolution or 'modification' of that organ. As pointed out in the text, however, the perception of Brahma differs from that of an ordinary object, in that It, being self-luminous, is not revealed by the light of the Intelligence reflected in the internal organ, but shines forth as soon as the latter has dispelled the Ignorance enveloping It.

The word which I have here rendered 'internal organ' is more properly 'thinking,' which is a component part of that organ. (See page 74.)

XII.

As, up to the time of this immediate cognition of Intelligence, which is his own essence, it is necessary to practice (a.) hearing (*śravaṇa*), (b.) consideration (*manana*), (c.) profound contemplation (*nididhyāsana*), and (d.) meditation (*samādhi*), these are now set forth.

(a.) 'Hearing' is the ascertaining of the drift of all the Vedāntic writings regarding the secondless Reality, by the use of the sixfold means of knowledge (*linga*). These means are (1) the beginning and the ending, (2) repetition, (3) novelty, (4) the result, (5) persuasion, and (6) illustration from analogy. As it has been said,¹ "The beginning and the ending, repetition, novelty, the result, persuasion, and illustration from analogy, are the means for the determination of the purport."

1. 'The beginning and the ending' (*upakra-*

¹ I cannot trace this quotation to its source.

mopasaṁhārau) are the mention¹ at the beginning and end of a chapter of the subject to be expounded in it; as in the 6th chapter of the *Chhândogya-Upanishad*, at the beginning of which, the secondless Reality which is to be set forth in it, is declared in the words "One only without a second," and, at the end, in the words "All this is of the essence of That."

2. 'Repetition' (*abhyāsa*) is the repeated declaration in a chapter of the subject which is to be set forth in it; as, for example, in that same chapter, the secondless Reality is set forth nine times in the words "That art Thou."

3. 'Novelty' (*apūrvatā*) is the fact that the subject to be treated of in a chapter is not an object of perception by any other means; as, for example, in that same chapter, the secondless Reality [there set forth] is not an object of perception by any other means.

4. 'The result' (*phala*) is the motive, set forth in various places, for acquiring the knowledge of Self who is to be treated of in a chapter, or for carrying that knowledge into practice; as, for example, in that same chapter (vi. 14, 2), where

¹ *Upapādanam* in the MSS., but *upādānam* in the editions.

it says, "The man who has a teacher knows [the truth], but he is delayed [from absorption] until he is set free [by death]; then he attains to it,"—the acquisition of the secondless Reality is set forth as the motive for acquiring a knowledge of It.

5. 'Persuasion'¹ (*arthavāda*) is the praising, in various places, the subject to be treated of in a chapter; just as, in that same chapter (vi. 1, 3), the secondless Reality is praised in these words,—
 "Didst thou ask for that instruction by which the unheard of becomes heard;—the unthought, thought,—the unknown, known?"

6. 'Illustration from analogy' (*upapatti*) is an argument stated in various places in support of the subject to be treated of in a chapter; as, for example, in that same chapter (vi. 1, 4), in demonstrating the secondless Reality, an argument is set forth as follows, to show that the variety of forms [in the universe] rests upon a foundation of words and nothing else,—
 "O, gentle one! as, by means

¹ "'Persuasion' is the setting forth of the end, i.e., of the motive; that is to say, it is a speech intended to commend the object of an injunction. For a persuasive speech, by means of laudation, &c., commends the object of an injunction with a view to our quickly engaging [in the performance of the ceremony enjoined]."—Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Nyāya*, ii. 63 (b).

of one lump of earth, everything earthen is known to be a thing resting upon words alone, a change of form, a name, and nothing in reality but earth," [so is it with the phenomenal world which is nought but Brahma]. . .

(b.) 'Consideration' is unceasing reflection on the secondless Reality which has been heard of, in conjunction with arguments in conformity with the teaching of the Vedânta.

(c.) 'Profound contemplation' is the flow of ideas consistent with the secondless Reality, to the exclusion of the notion of body and suchlike things which are inconsistent [with It].

(d.) 'Meditation' is of two kinds, viz. :—

1. *With* recognition of subject and object (*savikalpaka*), and

2. *Without* such recognition (*nirvikalpaka*).

(1.) 'Meditation with the recognition of subject and object' is the resting of the modification of the internal organ on the secondless Reality whose shape it has assumed, *without* any concern as to the merging of the distinction between the knower and the knowledge, &c. Then, just as there is the perception of earth [and of that alone], even though there be the consciousness of an earthen toy-ele-

phant, &c., so too is there the perception of the secondless Reality [alone], even though there be the consciousness of duality. As it has been said :¹—
 “I, ever free, am that secondless one whose essence is knowledge, like the ether [*i.e.*, pure and formless], supreme, once seen [that is, never changing, as the moon, &c., does], unborn, alone, everlasting, undefiled [by contact with Ignorance, &c.], all-pervading.”

(2.) ‘Meditation without the recognition of subject and object’ is the resting of the modification of the understanding on the secondless Reality whose shape it has assumed, *with* concern as to the merging of the distinction of knower and knowledge, &c., so as to be completely identified with It. Then, just as, owing to the disappearance of salt after it has [melted and so] assumed the shape of the water [into which it was thrown], nothing appears but the water,² so, by the disappearance of the modification of the internal organ after it has assumed the shape of the secondless Reality, nothing appears but the latter.

¹ *Upaniṣadśāstra*, verse 73. The word *abhiyuktaiḥ*, which, in the editions, precedes the quotation, has no manuscript authority. The MSS. also omit the first half of verse 74, which is included in the editions.

² Compare *Chhândogya-Upaniṣad*, vi. 13.

It must not be supposed that this state and sound sleep are identical; for, though in both alike the modification of the internal organ is not perceived, there is nevertheless this one distinction between them, that it is present in the former [though unperceived], but not in the latter.¹

¹ *Rational Refutation*, p. 224, but cf. *Yoga Aphorisms*, i. 10.

NOTES ON SECTION XII.

1. 'Profound contemplation is,' &c. (page 109).

The text of the Calcutta edition of 1875, and of all the MSS. I have consulted, stands thus:—*Vijāṭīyadehādipratyayarahitādvitīyavastusajāṭīyapratyayappravāho nīdīdhyāsanam*. That used by Dr. Ballantyne, and adopted too in the St. Petersburg edition of 1877, reads as follows:—*Vijāṭīyadehādipratyayarahitādvitīyavastuni tadākārākāritāyā buddheḥ sajāṭīyappravāho nīdīdhyāsanam*. It is thus translated by Dr. Ballantyne: "'Contemplation' is the homogeneous flow of the understanding mirroring its object, when this object is the Real, &c., to the exclusion of the notion of body or any other thing heterogeneous [to the one Reality mirrored in the understanding]."

2. 'I, ever free, am the secondless one,' &c.

This passage is a quotation from Śaṅkarācārya's *Upadeśasahasrī* ['*The Paṇḍit*' (Old Series), vol. iv. p. 71], but it is also found in the closing portion of the *Muktikopaniṣad*. The opening verses of this Upanishad, which is said to belong to the White Yajur Veda (!), introduce us to a scene 'in the charming city of Ayodhyā,' where Rāma, attended by Sītā, his brothers, and various sages, is addressed by Māruti, as the Supreme Self, the embodiment of existence, intelligence, and joy, and is asked to make known to him the way of escape from the fetters of transmigration. The sectarianism and style of this Upanishad stamp it as modern;¹ and it doubtless copied

¹ See Weber's *History of Indian Literature*, p. 165.

from the *Upadeśasahasrī*, not only the passage quoted in our text, but other verses in immediate connection with it.

The author of the *Vedântasâra* does not cite the passage as a quotation from the Veda, as he invariably does when quoting from an Upanishad, but ushers it in with the words '*tad uktam*' only.

3. For various explanations of the technical terms *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*,¹ see Ballantyne's *Tarkasangraha* (2d edition), para. 46; Translation of *Sāhitya Darpaṇa*, p. 52 (note); and Cowell's Translation of *Kusumānjali*, p. 20 (note).

4. *Samādhi*.

As to this, see the Notes on the next Section.

¹ With these two kinds of meditation compare the '*samprajñāta*' and '*asamprajñāta*' of the Yoga philosophy (*Aphorisms*, i. 17, 18). The former is 'meditation with an object,' and the latter 'meditation without an object.'

XIII.

THE means ancillary [to *nirvikalpaka samādhi*] are—

1. Forbearance (*yama*).
2. Minor religious observances (*niyama*).
3. Religious postures (*āsana*).
4. Regulation of the breath (*prāṇāyāma*).
5. Restraint of the organs of sense (*pratyāhāra*).
6. Fixed attention (*dhāraṇā*).
7. Contemplation (*dhyāna*).
8. Meditation (*samādhi*).

1. Acts of ‘forbearance’ are, sparing life, truthfulness, not stealing, chastity, and non-acceptance of gifts (*aparigraha*).

2. ‘Minor religious observances’ are, purification, contentment, endurance of hardships, inaudible repetition of sacred texts (*svādhyāya*), and concentration of the thoughts on *Īśvara*.

3. The 'religious postures' are distinguished by particular positions of the hands and feet, such as *Padmāsana*, *Svastikāsana*, and others.

4. 'Regulation of the breath' consists of the methods of restraining it known as *rechaka*, *pûraka*, and *kumbhaka*.

5. 'Restraint of the organs of sense' is the holding them back from their respective objects.

6. 'Fixed attention' is the fixing of the internal organ upon the secondless Reality.

7. 'Contemplation' is the flowing forth of the internal organ upon the secondless Reality, at intervals.

8. 'Meditation' is that already described as accompanied by the recognition of subject and object (*savikalpaka*).

To the meditation without recognition of subject and object, to which the above are subservient, there are four obstacles, viz.—

1. Mental inactivity (*laya*).
2. Distraction (*vikshepa*).
3. Passion (*kashāya*), and
4. The tasting of enjoyment (*rasāsvāda*).

1. 'Mental inactivity' is the drowsiness of the

modification of the internal organ owing to its not resting on the impartite Reality.

2. 'Distraction' is the resting of the modification of the internal organ on something else, on account of its not abiding on the impartite Reality.

3. 'Passion' is the not resting on the impartite Reality, by reason of the impeding of the modification of the internal organ by lust or other desire, even though there be no mental inactivity or distraction.

4. The 'tasting of enjoyment' is the experience of pleasure by the modification of the internal organ, in the recognition of subject and object, owing to its not resting on the impartite Reality; or it is the experiencing of such pleasure when about to commence meditation without the recognition of subject and object.

When the internal organ, free from these four hindrances, and motionless as a lamp sheltered from the wind, exists as the impartite Intelligence only, then is realised that which is called meditation without recognition of subject and object.

It has been said,¹ "When the internal organ has fallen into a state of inactivity, one should arouse it,—when it is distracted, one should

¹ *Gauḍapāda's Kārīkās*, iii. 44, 45.

render it quiescent [by turning away from objects of sense, &c.],—when it is affected by passion, one should realise the fact,—when quiescent, one should not disturb it. One should experience no pleasure [during discriminative meditation], but become free from attachment by means of discriminative intelligence.” And again¹—“As [the flame of] a lamp standing in a sheltered spot flickers not, this is regarded as an illustration [of a mind-restrained Yogî who is practising concentration of self].”

¹ *Bhagavadgîtâ*, vi. 19.

NOTES ON SECTION XIII.

The eight means of promoting *nirvikalpaka samādhi*, which are enumerated in the text, are taken from the *Yoga Aphorisms*, ii. 29; and the definitions of the eight are from the same source, namely, ii. 30-53, and iii. 1-3. The first two, *yama* and *niyama*, are also described in Manu iv. 204 (Sch.).

2. 'Religious postures.'

There are numerous postures prescribed for the Yogî, and some of them are indispensable for the attainment of Samādhi. Ten are enumerated in the last chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, but they do not exhaust the list. The most important are said to be the *Siddhāsana* and *Padmāsana*. The latter is thus described:—"Place the left foot upon the right thigh, and the right foot upon the left thigh; hold with the right hand the right great toe, and with the left hand the left great toe (the hands coming from behind the back and crossing each other); rest the chin on the interclavicular space, and fix the sight on the tip of the nose!"

In these postures the Yogî sits, and pronounces inaudibly the mystic syllable *Om*, "in order to tranquillise circulation and retard the respiratory movements."

3. *Prāṇāyāma*.

"When a Yogî, by practice, is enabled to maintain himself in one of the above-mentioned postures for the period of three hours, and to live upon a quantity of food proportional to the reduced condition of circulation and

respiration, without inconvenience, he proceeds to the practice of *Prāṇāyāma*. This is the fourth stage or division of Yoga. It is the suspension of the respiratory movements, which the Yogīs daily practise with a view to purging themselves from minor sins." The term *kumbhaka* means the interval between an inspiration (*pūṭhaka*) and an expiration (*rechaka*). The first act, says Professor Wilson,¹ is expiration, which is performed through the right nostril, whilst the left is closed with the fingers of the right hand. The thumb is then placed upon the right nostril and the fingers raised from the left, through which breath is inhaled. In the third act both nostrils are closed and breathing suspended. There are said to be eight varieties of *Kumbhaka*,—but to practise them successfully the two preliminary processes of *Khecharī mudrā* and *Mūlabandha* are absolutely necessary. The former is described as "the act of lengthening the tongue by incising the *frænum linguæ* and by constant exercise." This process is gone through because "a large and long tongue is indispensably necessary to human hybernation." *Prāṇāyāma* is stated to be of three kinds, namely, *Adhama*, *Madhyama*, and *Uttama*. The first "excites the secretion of sweat," the second "is attended by convulsive movements of the features," and the third raises the Yogī above the surface of the ground, whilst seated in the posture termed *Padmāsana*.

4. *Samādhi*.

"This is the eighth and last division of Yoga. It is a state of perfect human hybernation, in which a Yogī is insensible to heat and cold, to pleasure and to pain. . . . It is the total suspension of the functions of respiration

¹ *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, 5. 231.

and circulation, but not the extinction of those functions.”
“Practise the Kevala Kumbhaka . . . repeat the mystic syllable *Om* 20,736,000 times in silence, and meditate upon it; suspend the respiratory movements for the period of 12 days, and you will be in a state of Samâdhi!”

The above extracts are from a very interesting pamphlet on the practice of Yoga, by Sub-Assistant Surgeon Paul, and published in Benares by Messrs. Lazarus & Co. in 1882. It describes some remarkable and well-authenticated instances of hybernation practised by Yogis, and gives full details of all the preliminary processes. Much valuable information on the subject of Yoga is contained also in the last chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, already quoted, which was translated by Professor Cowell, and still more in the last chapter of the *Śāradātīlaka*, of which, however, there is no translation.

XIV.

THE characteristics of the 'liberated but still living' (*jīvanmukta*) are now to be described.

The 'liberated but still living' is he who by knowing the impartite Brahma, which is his own essence, [a result brought about] by the removal of the Ignorance enveloping It, perceives It clearly as the Impartite and his own essence; and, in consequence of the removal of Ignorance and its effects, such as accumulated works, doubt, and error, remains intent on Brahma,¹ freed from all fetters. As it is said in the Śruti,² "When that which is supreme and not supreme (*parāvara*) is seen, the fetter of the heart is burst, all doubts are removed, and works³ fade away."

On arising from meditation, though he sees

¹ Dr. Hall renders '*brahmanishṭhaḥ*' by 'abides in Brahma,' but the commentator explains it by '*Brahmaṇi nishṭhā tadekaparatā yasya*.'

² *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 2. 2. 8.

³ Those of the present or of a former birth which have not begun to bear fruit; but *not* those which brought about the present existence.—*Bhāṣya*.

that, by his body, which is the receptacle of flesh, blood, urine, filth, &c.,—by his organs, which are the seat of blindness, slowness, unskilfulness, &c.,—and by his internal organ, which is the seat of hunger, thirst, sorrow, infatuation, &c.,—works are being done according to the previous bent of each; and that he is experiencing the fruit of those which have already commenced to take effect, and which are not interfered with by his knowledge,—he regards them not as real because they have been cancelled. Just as one watching what he knows to be a conjuring performance does not regard it as a reality. It is said, too, in the Śruti,¹ “Though he has eyes, he is as though he had them not; though he has ears, he is as though he had none.” And again it has been said,² “He who, when awake, and even looking upon duality, yet, like one in sound sleep, sees it not as such, because there is [to him] no duality,—who, though acting, is free from [the results of] actions, he, and he alone is, without doubt, the knower of Self.” Just as he continues the practices of eating, walking about, &c., which existed before the attainment of true knowledge, so too he follows good desires

¹ I cannot trace this quotation.

² *Upadeśasahasrī*, verse 85.

alone, or is indifferent to both good and bad alike. It has been said,¹ “If he who knows the secondless Reality may act as he likes, what difference is there between the knowers of truth and dogs in respect of eating impure food?” Except the fact of knowing Brahma, there is no difference; the one knows the Self, and the other [the dog] does not.

In that state, humility and the rest, which are means of acquiring right apprehension, and good qualities, such as the absence of enmity and the like, cling to him merely as ornaments. It has been said,² “Qualities such as the absence of enmity and the like, exist without an effort in one who has attained to the knowledge of Self, but are not of the nature of means [to that end].” To conclude:—Experiencing, for the sustentation of his body only, the fruits of works which have begun to take effect, which are characterised by pleasure or pain, and are brought about by his own desire, or without any desire on his part, or at the desire of another,—and illuminating the reflections on his internal organ,—when the fruits of his works are exhausted, and his vital airs

¹ *Naishkarmyasiddhi*, iv. 62.

² *Ibid.*, iv. 69.

merge in the supreme Brahma which is all-per-vading happiness, then, owing to the destruction of Ignorance and also of the germs of its effects, he abides the Impartite Brahma which is absolute isolation, whose sole essence is joy, and which is free from all appearance of change. As the Śruti says,¹ "His vital airs ascend not" [*i.e.*, do not transmigrate], "but are dissolved within him;"² and³—"He already free [though in the body], is freed [from future embodiments]."

¹ *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, 4. 4. 6.

² This is intended for *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, 3. 2. 11, which reads "*atrava samavaliyante*,"—whereas the Vedāntasāra has "*atrava samavaliyante*," a misquotation which I have observed elsewhere also.—*Cf. Ātmapurāṇa*, v. 149-155, on this passage.

³ *Kaṭhopanishad*, 5. 1.

NOTES ON SECTION XIV.

1. '*Jīvanmukta*.'

The position of the 'liberated but still living' man closely resembles that of the Buddhist *Arhat* or *Rahat*. At death, the latter enters *Nirvāṇa*, that is, ceases to exist,¹—whilst the former, absorbed in Brahma, enters upon an unconscious and stone-like existence.

2. '*Accumulated works*.'

According to the Systems, works are of three kinds, viz., accumulated (*sanchita*), fructescent (*prārabdha*), and current (*kriyamāṇa*). The first are the works of former births which have not yet borne fruit; the second are those which have brought about the present life, and so have begun to bear fruit; and the third are those which are being performed during the present life, and which will bear fruit in a future one. According to the Vedānta, the true knowledge of Brahma and of one's own identity with It burns up the accumulated works and cancels the effects of the current ones. The fruits of the fructescent ones must be exhausted during the present life, and then at death emancipation is realised. These last cannot be destroyed by the knowledge of Brahma; but, according to the Yoga, the meditation which is styled in that system *asamprajñāta*, 'meditation without an object,'² can destroy them, and so is considered by Yogins to be superior to knowledge.³

¹ Spence Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 40, and *Eastern Monachism*, p. 290.

² *Aphorisms*, i. 18.

³ *Rational Refutation*, pp. 30, 31 (*note*).

It will interest the Marâthi student to notice that the common word *prârabdha*, 'fate,' 'destiny,' is just this technical term explained above—works which have begun to take effect, and the fruit of which it is impossible to evade.

3. '*Supreme and not supreme.*'

'Supreme' as cause, 'not supreme' as effect, says the scholiast. It might also be rendered 'The First and the Last,' that is, the all-inclusive entity. The fetter of the heart consists of desires resulting from Ignorance.

4. '*If he who knows the secondless Reality,*' &c.

This passage, in the editions, consists of a verse and a half, and reads as follows:—

Buddhâdvaitasatattvasya yatheshṭâcharaṇam yadi |
Śunâm tattvadṛṣṭâm chaiva ko bhedo 'śuchibhakṣaṇe ||
Brahmavittvam tathâ muktvâ sa âtmajno na chetara iti |

As it thus stands the passage looks like a quotation from one author, but such is not the case. In seven out of ten manuscripts which I have consulted in the India Office Library, the word *iti* is inserted at the end of the second line also, and those two are, indeed, all that are found in Sureśvara's work. The same couplet is introduced into the fourth chapter of the *Panchadaśī* in support of an appeal to the enlightened man to avoid evil lest he lose the benefits of his knowledge; and its aim is to show that if one who knows the truth throws off all restraint and acts as he likes, he is no better than a dog. That Sureśvara, too, disapproved of *yatheshṭâcharaṇa* is evident from the context of the passage in question, which I here subjoin:—

“*Athālepakapakshanirāsārtham āha | Buddhādvaitasatattvas-
ya yatheshṭācharaṇam yadi | śunām tattvadṛśām chaiva ko bhedo
'śuchiḥbhakṣaṇe || 62 || Kasmān na bhavati yasmāt | Adharmāḥ
jāyate jñānam yatheshṭācharaṇam tataḥ | dharmakārye katham
tat syād yatra dharmopī neshyate || 63 || . . . Tishṭhatu tāvat
sarvapravṛttibījaghaṣmaram jñānam, mumukshvavasthāyām api
na sambhavati yatheshṭācharaṇam | Tadāha | 'Yo hi yatra
viraktaḥ syān nāsan tasmai pravarttate | lokatrayād viraktatvān
mumukshuḥ kimitīhate' || 65 ||*”

The other half-couplet, however, of our text, seems to reverse this teaching, and to inculcate the doctrine that the knower of *Brahma* may act as he likes with impunity. In translating it I have gone on the lines of previous translators, but am very doubtful as to its real meaning. *Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī* introduces it with the remark—*Jīvan-
muktasya Brahmajñānitvābhimāno nāstītyatrāpi sammatiḥ
āha-Brahmavittvam ityādi*; and so appears to say that *Sadānanda* assents to the view, elsewhere propounded, that the ‘liberated but still living’ man, having got what he wants, ceases to have any concern for the knowledge of *Brahma*, and may behave as he likes. That the *sammati* is *Sadānanda*’s, and not that of some other sage, seems probable from the absence of some such qualifying word as *vṛiddha* prefixed to it, as is usual in such cases; but, on the other hand, if it is the author’s own view, why is it expressed in verse? The MSS. differ considerably in their reading of this line. Six have *yathā* instead of *tathā*; and four read *muktvā*, three *muktaḥ*, and two *muktā*. One omits the line altogether, and the commentator *Rāmatīrtha* makes no allusion to it.

In spite, however, of *Sureśvara*’s denunciation of *yathesh-
ṭācharaṇa*, there can be no doubt that it is upheld in

many Vedântic writings, and that Dr. Banerjea had good ground for saying that "Vedântic authors have boldly asserted that they are subject to no law, no rule, and that there is no such thing as virtue or vice, injunction or prohibition."¹ A few instances of such teaching will suffice:—

"By no deed soever is his future bliss harmed, not by theft, not by a Brahman's murder, nor by a mother's murder, nor by a father's murder; nor, if he wishes to commit sin, departs the bloom from his face."

—*Kaushîtaki-Upanishad*, iii. 1 (Cowell).

"The thought afflicts him not, 'What good have I left undone, what evil done?'"

—*Taittirîya-Upanishad*, ii. 9 (Gough).

"Then a thief is not a thief, a murderer not a murderer . . . he is not followed by good, not followed by evil."

—*Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, 4. 3. 22 (Max Müller).

"He is not defiled by an evil deed."

—*Bṛihadâraṇyaka* 4. 4. 23.

"As water adheres not to a lotus leaf, so no sinful deed adheres to one who knows thus."

—*Chhândogya-Upanishad*, 4. 14. 3.

"He who considers himself a doer of good or evil, his intelligence is at fault and grasps not the truth—so I think."

—*Mahâbhârata*, 12. 222. 17.

"As a water-bird is not defiled by moving in the water, so a liberated Yogi is not polluted by merit or by demerit."

—*Ibid.*, 12. 249. 17.

¹ *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*, p. 381.

“ Evil adheres not to an enlightened man, any more than water clings to a leaf ; but much sin sticks to the unenlightened man, just as lac to wood.”

—*Mahābhārata*, 12. 299. 7.

The commentator Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī remarks that, in view of such Vedic passages as those above quoted, some one may object that it is erroneous to state that the enlightened may not act as they please, and his only reply is, that although there undoubtedly are such passages in the Śruti and Smṛiti, yet they are merely designed to extol the position of the enlightened man and not to impel him to act in the manner there described !

But the line of argument adopted by this commentator, and also by other apologists, is unsafe, and does not get rid of the fact that some of the Upanishads, the chief source of the Vedānta doctrine, do, *without any qualification*, declare that sin and virtue are alike to one who knows Brahma ; and the system is therefore rightly charged with immorality. But, independently of such teaching as this, what moral results could possibly be expected from a system so devoid of motives for a life of true purity ? The Supreme Being, Brahma, is a cold Impersonality, out of relation with the world, unconscious of Its own existence and of ours, and devoid of all attributes and qualities. The so-called personal God, the first manifestation of the Impersonal, turns out on examination to be a myth ; there is no God apart from ourselves, no Creator, no Holy Being, no Father, no Judge—no one, in a word, to adore, to love, or to fear. And as for ourselves, we are only unreal actors on the semblance of a stage !

The goal, already referred to, is worthy of such a creed, being no less than the complete extinction of all spiritual, mental, and bodily powers by absorption into the Impersonal.

"Annihilation, then, as regards individuals, is as much the ultimate destiny of the soul as it is of the body, and 'Not to be' is the melancholy result of the religion and philosophy of the Hindus."¹

5. 'He already free, is freed.'

"Though illusion has not really real existence, yet it possesses apparent existence, and so it is capable of taking the soul captive. And again, the Vedântins say, that as illusion is only apparent, so the soul's being fettered is practical; that is, as illusion is false, so the soul's being fettered is likewise false. Neither was the soul ever actually fettered, nor is it now fettered, nor has it to be emancipated."²

This matter is also explained in the last chapter of the *Vedânta-paribhâshâ*:—"The joy which admits of no increase, is Brahma; as the Veda (*Tait. Up.*, 3. 6) says, 'He knew Brahma to be joy.' And the acquisition of Brahma, whose essence is joy, is *moksha*, and it is also the cessation of sorrow; as the Veda says, 'The knower of Brahma becomes Brahma,' and again, 'The knower of Self passes beyond sorrow' (*Mundaka*, 3. 2. 9; *Chhândogya*, 7. 1. 3). The acquisition of another world, or the sensuous joy derivable therefrom, is not *moksha*; for as it is the result of works, and therefore non-eternal, the subject of such liberation is liable to future births. If you say that, as, even according to our view, the acquisition of bliss and

¹ Wilson's *Essays on the Religion of the Hindus*, ii. 114.

² *Rational Refutation*, p. 189.

the cessation of misery have a beginning, they are therefore chargeable with the same defect [*i.e.*, of being non-eternal and therefore transitory], and, that if they have not a beginning, then the enjoining of 'hearing' &c., with a view to *moksha*, is absurd, I reply, Not so; for, although *moksha*, consisting of Brahma, is already in possession, still, because of the erroneous idea that it is not possessed, it is proper to make use of means for attaining it. The cessation of misery, too, in the form of Brahma, which is the substrate of all, is already an accomplished fact. Even in mundane affairs, however, we see the need of obtaining things already obtained, and of removing things already removed. For example, when a piece of gold is in one's hand, but has been forgotten [and is being searched for], and some person says, 'Why, the gold is in your hand,' one regains it as if it had not already been in possession. So, too, in the case of one who is under the delusion that the garland encircling his ankle is a snake; when a reliable person tells him that it is not a snake, the snake is removed although it was already removed [*i.e.*, had never existed]. In like manner, the acquisition of a joy already possessed, and the cessation of misery already removed, in other words, *liberation*, is an object [to be sought after]."

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